





























































of	my	 fellow	 students	 in	 the	 Locke	 building,	 thanks	 guys!	 Terribly	 nerdy	 political	 science	
discussions	 and	 hilarious	 conversations	 about	 things	 that	 should	 not	 be	 mentioned	 in	 a	
publicly	 available	document	made	 the	 long	hours	 in	 the	office	 so	worth	 it.	 I	 also	need	 to	
acknowledge	the	patience	and	support	of	friends	outside	of	the	university,	who	have	put	up	




































civilisational	 language.	 During	 this	 time,	 ‘civilised’	 nations	 used	 force	 and	 violence	 to	
purportedly	teach	and	nurture	the	‘uncivilised	barbarians.’	While	this	practice	was	argued	to	
be	 underpinned	 by	 humanitarianism,	 moral	 responsibility,	 and	 universal	 values,	 it	 often	
misrepresented	what	was	truly	happening	in	the	colonies,	in	which	violence,	exploitation,	and	
cultural	dislocation	was	standard	practice.		







associated	 practices	 continue	 to	 exist	 in	 contemporary	 international	 relations.	 The	
































































practice	 of	 dividing	 the	world	 into	 distinct	 categories	 of	 civilisational	 status,	whereby	 the	
‘inherent’	differences	in	people	and	societies	ultimately	 leads	to	the	classification	of	being	
either	 ‘civilised’	 or	 ‘uncivilised.’	 The	 practices	 associated	 with	 it	 have	 resulted	 in	 a	
multidisciplinary	field	of	research	which	examines	the	causes	and	consequences	of	dividing	
the	world	into	distinct	categories	of	civilisational	status.	This	thesis	sets	out	to	examine	the	
discourse	 on	 the	 standard	 of	 civilisation	 in	 historical	 international	 relations,	 through	 an	
exploration	of	the	hypothesis	that	contemporary	military	intervention	continues	to	employ	
civilisational	language	to	justify	and	legitimise	violence	and	force.		









civilisational	 practices	 and	 language	 conducted	 by	 western	 European	 nations	 during	
colonisation	are,	indeed,	reproduced	in	contemporary	international	relations.	




those	 people	 determined	 to	 be	 on	 the	 ‘outside’	 of	 civilised	 international	 society.	 This	
discourse	tends	to	position	western	European	countries	(and	later	their	settler	colonies)	as	
the	enlightened	and	advanced	nations.	Conduct	between	these	nations	would	be	governed	
by	 the	 principle	 of	 equality,	 supported	 by	 international	 law.	 In	 this	 regard,	 an	 equal	
community	of	nations	was	created	among	civilised	peoples,	and	aggressive	war	and	conquest	
against	each	other	was	ruled	out.	
                                                
1	The	name	of	the	country	was	officially	changed	to	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Timor-Leste	when	it	gained	official	
independence	status	in	May	2002.	In	this	study,	the	country	is	referred	to	as	East	Timor	in	the	period	prior	to	it	












and	 legitimise	 their	 violent	 pacification	 and	 domination	 of	 indigenous	 societies.	 This	
language,	which	 included	 labelling	 the	 ‘uncivilised’	as	animals,	barbarians,	and	subhuman,	
had	the	impact	of	excluding	and	disciplining	peoples	and	societies	understood	as	‘different	





occurs	 between	 a	minority	 of	 foreign	 invaders	 against	 an	 indigenous	majority.3	 From	 this	
perspective,	most	decisions	which	affect	the	lives	of	the	colonised	people	are	implemented	






The	 use	 of	 civilisational	 language	 also	 has	 an	 important	 relationship	 with	 the	





boundaries	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century’s	 dominant	 society.”8	 This	 process	 has	 had	 the	
consequence	of	creating	a	hierarchical	international	system,	whereby	exceptions	to	the	rules	
                                                

















that	 this	 thesis	 employs	 is	 the	 use	 of	 historical	 analysis.	 By	 employing	 a	 framework	 of	
examining	historical	events	and	discourse	a	better	appreciation	can	be	gained	of	its	drivers	
and	its	characteristics.	This	is	critical	to	helping	to	identify	evidence	of	its	contemporary	use	












gather	 evidence	 of	 civilisational	 language	 being	 used	 to	 justify	 and	 legitimise	 military	


































I.	 Initially	 representing	a	 reaction	against	 the	 “wish-dreams	of	 the	 initial	 stage,”	or	 liberal	





were	 considered	 for	 use	 in	 this	 study,	 and	 have	 direct	 relevance	 to	 the	 domination	 and	
subjugation	 of	 colonial	 territories,	 it	 was	 considered	 that	 classical	 realism	 provides	 an	
undervalued	and	understudied	critique	of	colonialism	and	standard	of	civilisation	discourse.	
Indeed,	the	three	realist	scholars	that	this	study	examines	all	provide	damning	indictments	
on	 the	 liberal	 international	 understanding	 that	 universal	 morality	 and	 ethical	 standards	
existed,	and	could	be	made	 independent	of	politics.	They	also	questioned	the	assumption	
that	 having	 a	 ‘universal	 conscience	 of	 mankind’	 was	 both	 an	 achievable	 and	 desirable	




15	Mark	Salter,	“Not	Waiting	 for	 the	Barbarians,”	 in	Civilizational	 Identity:	The	Production	and	Reproduction	of	
‘Civilizations’	 in	 International	 Relations,	 eds.	 Martin	 Hall	 and	 Patrick	 Thaddeus	 Jackson	 (New	 York:	 Palgrave	
Macmillan,	2007),	82.	

















occasions	 ‘exceptions’	 to	 the	 overarching	 international	 legal	 principle	 of	 non-intervention	
were	deemed	permissible,	as	civilisational	discourse	was	employed	in	order	to	legitimise	and	
justify	colonisation,	conquest,	and	domination	over	the	population.	
The	 case	 of	 East	 Timor	 was	 chosen	 due	 to	 the	 unique	 nature	 in	 which	 multiple	
interventions	have	 taken	place,	by	a	host	of	different	actors.	 In	 this	 regard,	 there	was	an	









                                                






















discourse	 was	 used	 by	 the	 interveners,	 in	 order	 to	 justify	 and	 legitimise	 their	 initial	
intervention	 and	 their	 continued	 presence	 in	 the	 country.	 In	 these	 cases,	 a	 clear	 pattern	







violence	 and	 domination	 over	 them	 and	 resulted	 in	 negative	 consequences	 for	 Timorese	
society.	
Structure	of	the	Thesis	
This	 thesis	 will	 begin	 by	 engaging	 with	 the	 early	 works	 of	 well-known	 philosophers	 and	




societies,	 will	 be	 examined	 first.	 The	 centrality	 of	 natural	 law	 in	 legitmising	 violence	 and	
intevention	 in	the	conquest	of	the	New	World	and	the	 later	colonisation	of	non-European	
territories,	will	then	be	examined.	This	chapter	will	also	explore	the	development	of	liberal	
international	 theory,	 and	 in	 particular,	 the	 normative	 and	 moralistic	 language	 used	 to	
underpin	the	liberalism	of	this	era.	

















	 The	 final	 chapter	 will	 apply	 the	 consequences	 of	 the	 analysis	 undertaken	 in	 the	







under	different	 labels,	 their	targets	and	their	effects	have	 largely	remained	the	same.	The	

















In	 order	 to	 understand	 the	 implications	 of	 the	 discourse	 of	 civilisation	 in	 contemporary	
international	relations,	it	is	necessary	to	have	an	understanding	of	how	and	why	this	concept	
gained	such	 influence	 in	historical	discourse	and	practice.	 In	 this	context,	 this	chapter	will	
examine	the	evolution	of	the	discourse	on	civilisation	from	the	thirteenth	to	the	nineteenth	
century.	 In	particular,	 this	chapter	will	analyse	how	and	why	discourse	on	the	standard	of	







In	 this	 regard,	 very	 specific	 language	was	 used	by	western	 European	nations	 during	 their	
conquering	 and	 colonisation	 of	 the	 non-European	 world.	 This	 language,	 which	 included	
labelling	the	‘uncivilised’	as	animals,	had	the	impact	of	excluding	and	disciplining	peoples	and	
societies	 understood	 as	 ‘different	 and	 alien.’	 This	 process	was	 employed	 in	 order	 to	 give	
normative	 and	 legal	 underpinnings	 to	 the	 violent	 interventions	 conducted	 by	 Western	
European	 nations.	 The	 historical	 use	 of	 the	 discourse	 on	 the	 standard	 of	 civilisation	 had	
profound	 impact	 on	 legal	 understandings	 of	 indigenous	 population	 status	 and	 rights,	 for	
centuries	to	come.		
Pope	Innocent	IV:	The	Status	and	Rights	of	Infidels	
The	 emergence	 of	 medieval	 discourse	 on	 conquest,	 colonisation,	 and	 the	 standard	 of	
civilisation	can	be	traced	back	to	the	Crusades	undertaken	by	Christian	armies,	from	the	years	
1096	to	1271.22	The	dominant	school	of	thought	on	the	nature	of	man	at	this	time	was	the	
Alanian	 position,	 under	 the	 authority	 of	 the	 hierocratic	 canonist	 Alanus.	 From	an	Alanian	
perspective,	 infidels,	by	virtue	of	their	non-Christianity,	possessed	no	natural	 legal	right	to	
control	property	or	territory.23	The	casting	of	all	non-Christians	as	being	naturally	different	




                                                
22	James.	A.		Brundage,	Medieval	Canon	Law	and	the	Crusader	(Madison:	University	of	Wisconsin	Press,	1969),	76.		








infidels	had	natural	 legal	 rights,	 including	 the	 right	 to	 hold	 property,	 and	 they	 should	 be	
provided	 some	measure	 of	 protection	 against	 the	 dispossession	 of	 their	 property.24	 This	
understanding	was,	 in	part,	promoted	on	the	understanding	that	all	men	were	created	by	
god,	and	therefore	all	men	held	natural	rights.25	This	firmly	challenged	the	Alanian	principle	
that	 natural	 rights	 were	 bestowed	 only	 on	 Christian	 populations,	 by	 virtue	 of	 their	
Christianity.	The	papacy	was	reportedly	so	afraid	that	this	Artistotelian	vision	would	take	hold,	
and	threaten	the	Church’s	own	Alanian	worldview,	that	they	outlawed	the	use	of	Aristotle’s	
work	 in	 all	 Church	 libraries.26	 By	 the	mid-thirteenth	 century,	 one	 of	 the	most	 influential	












natural	 law	 to	 exercise	 social	 and	 political	 rights,	 by	 rational	 means.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 this	
reasoning,	Innocent	argued	that	non-Christians	should	be	able	to	determine	their	own	leaders	
and	 exercise	 sovereign	 control	 over	 property	 and	 territory.29	 Furthermore,	 on	 account	 of	
‘infidels’	possessing	these	naturally-endowed	rights,	Christians	could	not	legally	invade	and	
plunder	 their	 lands,	 solely	 because	 of	 the	 infidels	 non-Christian	 status.	 Pope	 Innocent’s	
understanding	of	the	natural	rights	of	infidels	can	be	succinctly	summarised	in	the	following	
excerpt:	
























the	whole	 “human	 flock,”	which	 necessarily	 included	 infidels	 and	 pagans.31	 Innocent	 also	
argued	that	intervention	against	infidels	could	take	place	if	they	had	clearly	violated	natural	






idols.34	 The	 third	 primary	 exception	 to	 Innocent’s	 understanding	 of	 the	 natural	 rights	 of	
infidels,	was	that	they	had	to	allow	Christian	missionaries	to	be	in	their	presence	in	order	to	
preach	gospel,	otherwise	Christian	armies	would,	again,	be	 justified	 in	waging	war	against	






rights	of	man.	Pope	 Innocent	was	 the	 first	medieval	 theorist	 to	 attempt	 to	 systematically	
address	 the	question	of	whether	Christian	nations	could	 legally	and	 legitimately	 intervene	
against	non-Christians.	His	pronouncements	on	the	status	of	infidel	rights	was	arguably	his	
most	enduring	contribution	to	Western	legal	thought.36	Innocent’s	attempt	to	synthesise	the	













an	 alternative	 position	 could	 also	 be	 suggested.	 It	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 Innocent	merely	
perpetuated	the	theory	that	there	could	be	justified	differential	treatment	of	non-Christians	
societies,	 and	 that	 rules	 of	 protection	 could	 be	 discarded,	 if	 and	when	 it	 suited	 Christian	
armies.		
An	 analysis	 of	 later	 discourse	 on	 the	 standard	 of	 civilisation	 demonstrates	 that	




dominant	feature	of	 intervention	discourse	 in	contemporary	 international	relations.	 In	the	
case	of	interventions	in	East	Timor,	the	argument	has	been	made	on	a	number	of	occasions	







used	 during	 the	 violent	 suppression	 of	 indigenous	 populations,	 through	 to	 Europe’s	
discoveries	of	 the	New	World.37	 The	discovery	of	 the	New	World	began	with	Christopher	
Columbus’	 first	 expeditions	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 Spanish	 Crown	 during	 his	 voyages	 to	 the	
Americas	 in	 the	 late	 fifteenth	 century.	 The	 mission	 of	 European	 monarchies,	 which	 had	






or	 introduced	 disease	 and	 illness,	 were	 controlled	 and	 dominated	 by	 varying	 methods,	
including	compulsion,	periods	of	discipline,	and	forced	schooling	in	the	ways	of	the	‘civilised’	
Europeans.39		










of	empire.40	The	dominant	understanding	of	 the	rights	of	man	at	 this	 time	followed	more	
closely	to	the	Humanist	position,	whereby	dispossession	of	property	and	territory	could	not	
be	 justified	 solely	due	 to	a	population’s	non-Christianity.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	 theorising	of	
Pope	 Innocent	 IV	 provided	 an	 early	 basis	 of	 the	 rules	 which	 governed	 the	 interactions	
between	 the	 colonisers	 and	 the	 indigenous	populations.	 Indeed,	 the	 Spanish	Crown	drew	





and	 justifiably	 take	 action	 against	 them.	 Rather	 than	 afford	 protection,	 Innocent’s	
commentary	 was	 wielded	 to	 enforce	 the	 idea	 that	 because	 they	 were	 ‘different’	 to	 the	
civilised	Europeans,	the	indigenous	population	of	the	New	World	could	be	treated	differently.		
An	analysis	of	 the	discourse	used	at	 this	 time	also	 reveals	 that	 there	was	a	 strong	







human	 beings.”43	 Positioning	 the	 native	 populations	 as	 being	 subhuman,	 inferior,	 and	
different,	had	the	effect	of	helping	to	justify	the	violence	required	to	enslave	and	conquer	
them.	This	process	of	employing	specific	language	to	cast	a	population	as	‘different’	and	being	




primitive,	 weak,	 and	 different.	 The	 positioning	 of	 the	 Timorese	 in	 this	 light	 had	 striking	
parallels	 to	 the	 standard	 of	 civilisation	 discourse	 employed	 during	 the	 conquest	 and	
colonisation	of	the	New	World.	










In	 response	 to	 the	 reports	 of	 the	 extremely	 violent	 treatment	 and	 subjugation	 of	 the	
indigenous	 populations	 in	 the	 New	 World,	 a	 number	 of	 influential	 philosophers	 and	
theologians	 began	 to	 question	 some	 of	 the	 arguments	 used	 to	 justify	 the	 conquistadors’	
actions.	The	most	influential	of	these	sixteenth	century	theologians	was	Francisco	de	Vitoria.	
Vitoria	 was	 a	 Spanish	 Dominican	 Friar,	 who	 himself	 was	 also	 heavily	 influenced	 by	 Pope	
Innocent	IV’s	natural-law	based	discussion	of	infidel	rights.	He	was	a	leading	proponent	of	the	




Vitoria’s	 conception	 of	 a	 binding	 ‘Law	 of	 Nations’	will	 be	 discussed	 in	more	 detail	 in	 the	
coming	 section,	 but	 it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 it	 gained	 great	 prominence	 in	 sixteenth	







creature	 and	 therefore	 natural	 rights	 afforded	 him	 the	 civil	 rights	 of	 ownership	 over	
property.49	 In	 an	 argument	 the	 parallels	 the	 one	 given	 by	 Innocent	 before	 him,	 Vitoria	
expressed	 his	 belief	 that	 the	 Spanish	 colonialists	 could	 not	 simply	 dispossess	 the	 native	
population	of	their	natural-legal	right	to	have	control	over	property:	
the	 barbarians	 in	 question	 can	 not	 be	 barred	 from	being	 true	 owners,	 alike	 in	 public	 and	
private	law,	by	reason	of	the	sin	of	unbelief	or	any	other	mortal	sin,	nor	does	such	sin	entitle	
Christians	to	seize	their	goods	and	lands.50	














theft	 “no	 less	 than	 if	 it	 were	 done	 to	 Christians.”51	 These	 passages	 from	 Vitoria	 show	 a	
dismissal	of	 the	 foundational	premise	of	 the	aforementioned	Alanian	position,	 in	a	similar	
nature	 to	 that	 proposed	 by	 Innocent.	 In	 a	 departure	 from	 Innocent’s	 earlier	 theorising,	






Innocent	 before	 him,	 this	 had	 the	 impact	 of	 continuing	 to	 provide	 justifications	 for	 the	
conquest	and	violent	domination	over	populations	deemed	to	be	‘different.’	
Central	to	Vitoria’s	theorising	on	the	conquest	and	treatment	of	native	populations	




Spanish	 could	 enforce	 against	 them	 “the	 rights	 of	 war,	 despoiling	 them	 of	 their	 goods,	




where	 this	 can	 be	 done	 without	 injury	 to	 themselves.”54	 Accordingly,	 from	 Vitoria’s	
perspective,	while	natural	law	bought	with	it	some	protection	for	the	‘natives,’	it	also	came	
with	duties.	In	the	end,	native	populations	were	deemed	to	have	breached	these	duties,	time	
and	 again,	 and	 they	 were	 thus	 wielded	 against	 them,	 in	 order	 to	 justify	 the	 violent	
intervention	directed	at	them	by	their	colonisers.		






                                                









From	 Vitoria’s	 perspective,	 the	 way	 in	 which	 to	 improve	 the	 lives	 of	 these	 ‘unintelligent	
barbarians’	was	 for	 advanced	 Christian	 nations	 to	 teach	 and	 nurture	 them	 in	 the	way	 of	
advanced	 civilisation.	 This	 would,	 eventually,	 overcome	 their	 ‘barbarous	 upbringings’.	 In	
circumstances	where	it	was	deemed	that	native	populations	were	incapable	of	administering	
proper	governance,	Vitoria	argued	that	the	Spanish	should,	forcibly	if	necessary,	take	control	









necessarily	 meant	 that	 international	 society	 was	 hierarchical,	 with	 the	 civilised	 nations	
playing	 the	 part	 of	 the	 teachers,	 tutors,	 and	 enforcers,	 over	 the	 unintelligent	 and	 lower	
ranked	‘barbarians,’	who	required	tutelage.	
Vitoria’s	theory	on	the	Law	of	Nations	provided	Western	discourse	with	one	of	the	
most	 important	 arguments	 on	 the	 rights	 of	 ‘civilised’	 Europeans	 to	 conquer	 and	 colonise	







them	as	being	 in	breach	of	 the	same	universal	natural	 laws,	which	had	obligated	 them	to	
accept	civilised	nations	right	to	trade	and	proselytise	them.60	
Antony	 Anghie	 has	 described	 Vitoria’s	 exception-based	 view	 as	 being,	
“schizophrenic,”	noting	that	Vitoria	viewed	the	‘natives’	as	being	“both	alike	and	unlike	the	
Spaniards.”61	 Anghie	 maintains	 that	 it	 was	 this	 ‘schizophrenia’	 on	 Vitoria’s	 behalf	 which	
resulted	in	the	perpetuation	of	the	argument	that	the	Spanish	had	legitimate	and	justifiable	




























used	 in	order	 to	 justify	and	 legitimise	European	colonial	activity,	western	European	states	
were	also	fighting	wars	inside	the	borders	of	Europe.	The	Peace	of	Westphalia	was	a	series	of	
peace	 treaties	 in	1648,	which	 sought	 to	 settle	many	of	 these	conflicts	within	Europe.	The	
Treaties	contained	explicit	provisions	for	religious	tolerance,	which	sought	to	overcome	the	
powerful	religious	differences	 in	Europe	between	Catholics,	Calvinists,	and	Lutherans,65	by	
granting	 the	 signatories	 supreme	 political	 authority	 within	 their	 own	 domains.66	 Before	
Westphalia,	 western	 European	 populations	 had	 a	 variety	 of	 conflictual	 and	 overlapping	











65	 Treaty	 of	Westphalia.	 “Peace	 Treaty	 between	 the	 Holy	 Roman	 Emperor	 and	 the	 King	 of	 France	 and	 their	












that	 from	 Westphalia	 through	 until	 the	 early	 nineteenth	 century,	 the	 concept	 of	 state	
sovereignty,	 “retained	 its	 conception	 as	 supreme	 authority,	 granting	 a	 state	 exclusive	
jurisdiction	and	control	over	all	objects	and	subjects	in	its	territory,	to	the	exclusion	of	any	
other	influence.”70	However,	this	analysis	fails	to	recognise	or	account	for	the	fact	that	the	
Westphalian	 system	was	 at	 its	 core	 a	 western	 European	 conception,	 which	 covered	 and	
applied	only	 to	 those	 territories	 and	populations	which	were	 conceived	 to	be	part	 of	 the	
family	of	the	‘civilised’	nations.	




who	 continued	 to	 conquer	 and	 colonise	 territories	 not	 covered	 by	 these	 international	





civilised	 states,	 the	claims	which	 they	make	 to	 sovereignty	over	 the	 region	and	 leaves	 the	
treatment	of	the	natives	to	the	conscience	of	the	state	to	which	sovereignty	is	awarded.71		
























afforded	 to	western	 European	nations	under	 the	Peace	of	Westphalia.	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	
arguments	 put	 forward	 by	 Pope	 Innocent	 IV	 and	 Francisco	 de	 Vitoria,	 to	 the	 effect	 that	
breaches	 of	 natural	 law	 would	 allow	 for	 legitimate	 intervention,	 were	 used	 heavily	 by	
colonialists.	 This	 had	 the	 impact	 of	 dividing	 the	 world	 into	 those	 who	 were	 afforded	






of	 demarcating	 and	 entrenching	 ‘differences’	 between	 the	 perceived	 ‘civilised,’	 and	 the	
‘barbarians.’	In	the	relations	between	European	states	and	populations	outside	of	European	
borders,	 the	Treaties	of	Westphalia	reiterated	and	reinforced	previous	medieval	practices,	
which	 reasserted	 the	 perception	 of	 the	 superiority	 of	 European	 Christianity	 and	Western	
‘civilisation.’73	
Enlightenment	Era:	True	Universal	Principles?	Or	Just	for	the	Privileged	Few	









also	 the	 promotion	 of	 the	 principles	 of	 democracy,	 liberty,	 common	 humanity,	 and	
humanitarianism.	The	universality	of	these	concepts,	and	the	purported	support	of	them	in	
international	law,	were	heavily	promoted	by	Enlightenment	jurists	and	theorists.75	Prominent	
figures	 during	 this	 Enlightenment	 era	 included	 Voltaire,	 Immanuel	 Kant,	 Jean-Jacques	
Rousseau,	 Adam	 Smith,	 and	 John	 Locke.	 German	 jurist	 and	 political	 theorist	 Carl	 Schmitt	
commented	 that	 enlightenment	 era	 thinkers	 held	 on	 to	 the	 belief	 that	 “humanity…is	 a	












example,	 Bowden	 argues	 that	 the	 dominant	 “architects”	 of	 international	 society	 today,	
“continue	to	be	informed	and	influenced	by	a	faith	in	the	Enlightenment	ideal	of	progress	and	













and	 Christian	 people	 of	 Europe	 or	 to	 those	 of	 European	 origin.”78	 Purported	 universal	
principles	of	equality	and	humanity	could	be	superseded,	in	this	regard,	in	order	to	allow	for	
intervention	against	‘uncivilised’	peoples.	The	standard	of	civilisation,	in	effect,	policed	which	







                                                
76	It	is	important	to	note,	however,	that	Schmitt	was	a	strong	critic	of	the	purported	‘universal’	ideals	espoused	
by	Enlightenment	 thinkers,	 he	 argued	 that	 “the	eighteenth-century	humanitarian	 concept	of	humanity	was	 a	



















impact	 on	 both	 intervention	 and	 colonial	 policies	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 and	 beyond.	
While	 exceptions	 continued	 to	 allow	 for	 the	 justification	 of	 intervention	 outside	western	
Europe,	 there	was	a	 recognition	that	 it	would	appear	 improper	 to	not	acknowledge	these	
universal	 principles,	 and	 effusive	 humanitarian	 rhetoric,	 in	 the	 practice	 of	 intervention.	
Western	European	political	elites	began	to	promote	civilisation	as	a	duty	or	responsibility	of	
advanced	Europeans	to	spread,	in	order	to	improve	the	standards	and	conditions	of	the	native	







mission,’	 or	 ‘white	 man’s	 burden.’	 This	 process	 closely	 mirrored	 Vitoria’s	 assumptions	




role	of	 the	civilising	mission	can	be	 found	during	 the	Berlin	Conference	on	Africa	 in	1885,	
whereby	the	European	colonial	powers	agreed	(among	themselves)	to	“bind	themselves	to	
watch	over	 the	preservation	of	 the	native	 tribes,	and	 to	care	 for	 the	 improvement	of	 the	
conditions	of	their	moral	and	material	well-being,”	with	the	ultimate	goal	being	to,	“instruct	
the	natives	and	bringing	home	to	them	the	blessings	of	civilisation.”81	International	law,	in	
this	 regard,	 began	 to	 become	 deeply	 embedded	 with	 the	 language	 of	 the	 standard	 of	
civilisation.82	From	Martti	Koskenniemi’s	perspective,	this	was	done	deliberately,	as	it	would	
have	 been	 “impossible	 to	 rationally	 explain,	 let	 alone	 to	 justify,	 why	 non-European	
                                                
80	 James	 Lorimer,	The	 Institutes	 of	 the	 Law	 of	 Nations:	 A	 Treatise	 of	 the	 Jural	 Relations	 of	 Separate	 Political	
Communities,	vol.	1.	(Edinburgh:	William	Blackwood	and	Sons,	1883),	160-61.	









underpinnings.	 The	 argument	 was	 made	 that	 humanitarian	 principles,	 as	 expounded	 by	
Enlightenment	 thinkers,	were	being	 followed,	and	once	 the	 ‘blessings	of	 civilisation’	were	
bought	 to	 the	native	 tribes,	 they	 could	also	enter	 the	 ranks	of	 ‘civilised	 states.’	Once	 this	
process	had	occurred,	external	 intervention	into	their	domestic	affairs	would	no	longer	be	






“not	 members	 of	 the	 same	 moral	 order.”85	 This	 notion	 of	 racial	 superiority	 was	 deeply	
entrenched	 in	 the	 ideology	 of	 the	 European	 colonisers,	 and	 further	 underpinned	 the	
legitimisation,	in	their	view,	of	the	differential	treatment	of	colonial	populations.	As	with	the	













Army	 in	 the	 early	 twentieth	 century.	 Colonel	 Fuller,	 in	 his	 book	The	Reformation	 of	War,	
writes,	“in	small	wars	against	uncivilised	nations,	the	form	of	warfare	to	be	adopted	must	


















humane	 and	 enlightened	 colonial	 ruler,	 but	 of	 their	 encounter	 with	 the	 West,	 the	 arch	
aggressor	of	modern	times.89	
Roland	 Paris	 offers	 a	 similar	 bleak	 view	 of	 the	 entire	 colonial	 process,	 maintaining	 that	
expressions	of	moral	responsibility	and	universal	values	by	European	colonial	powers	often	
misrepresented	what	was	truly	happening	in	the	colonies,	in	which	colonial	states,	“blazed	a	
trail	 of	 brutality,	 exploitation,	 and	 cultural	 dislocation.”90	 Charles	 Salomon,	who	wrote	on	
French	colonisation	 in	 the	 late	nineteenth	century,	argued	that	 there	was	“no	word	more	
vague,	 and	 has	 permitted	 the	 commission	 of	 more	 crimes,	 than	 that	 of	 civilization.”91	
Salomon	 saw	 absolute	 hypocrisy	 in	 discourse	 which	 professed	 that	 there	 were	 moral	
underpinnings	to	civilising	missions,	and	he	further	maintained	that	a	cursory	look	at	history	
proved	that	“all	colonies	begins	with	violence,	injustice	and	shedding	of	blood:	the	result	is	




civilising	 role	 of	 the	 Europeans	 were,	 in	 fact,	 often	 misused	 to	 provide	 cover	 for	 brutal	




nation	 as	 possible.	 From	 Hans	 Morgenthau’s	 perspective,	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 legal	










commitments	 to	 ‘civilise’	 clearly	 served	 the	 political	 purposes	 of	 particular	 nations.93	
Morgenthau	 argued	 that	 the	 so-called	 universal	 principles	 promoted	 by	 Enlightenment	













protected.	 From	 Mill’s	 perspective,	 the	 relations	 between	 ‘civilised’	 nations	 should	 be	
governed	by	the	principle	of	equality,	and	furthermore,	international	law	should	regulate	the	
conduct	and	relations	between	these	civilised	nations.95	In	this	regard,	Mill	followed	closely	









be	 promoted	 and	 protected,	 he	 also	 outlined	 a	 number	 of	 ‘legitimate’	 exceptions	 to	 this	
theory,	 including	 that	 intervention	 against	 ‘barbarians’	 could	 be	 permissible	 under	 some	
circumstances.	From	Mill’s	perspective,	to	suppose	that	the	same	international	principles	of	
protection,	 and	 the	 same	 rules	 of	 international	morality,	 could	 operate	 between	 civilised	
nations	and	“the	barbarians”	in	the	colonies,	was	a	very	grave	error.98	Mill	argued	strongly	
that	if	one	was	to	characterise	intervention	against	“barbarous	people”	as	a	“violation	of	the	










Law	 of	 Nations,”	 it	would	 only	 show	 one	 to	 be	 uneducated	 on	 the	 subject.99	 As	 such,	 in	
keeping	 with	 the	 reasoning	 of	 many	 philosophers	 and	 theologians	 before	 him,	 Mill	
maintained	that	there	were	exceptions	to	the	protection	that	the	Law	of	Nations	afforded.	In	
particular,	he	 suggested	 that	 there	were	 some	who	by	 reason	of	 limited	 faculty	were	not	
deserving	 of	 protection	 from	 intervention	 by	 outsiders.	 Mill	 defined	 these	 people	 as	
“barbarians,”	who	had	limited	capabilities,	no	civilised	government,	and	a	woeful	inability	to	
reciprocate	 in	 international	 agreements.100	 This	 inability	 to	 abide	 by	 the	 principle	 of	
reciprocity	and	follow	international	law,	in	conjunction	with	their	‘uncivilised’	governments,	
made	 maintaining	 a	 stable	 relationship	 with	 the	 ‘barbarians’	 impossible.	 If	 a	 stable	
relationship	could	not	be	maintained,	Mill	believed	that	civilised	nations	could	not	 just	be	
content	with	 taking	 a	 defensive	 position,	 rather	 a	more	 aggressive	 intervention	 could	 be	
required.101	Civilised	nations	would	be	permitted,	 in	Mill’s	view,	to	conquer	the	barbarous	
nation,	 and	 “assert	 so	much	authority	over	 them,	and	 so	break	 their	 spirit.”102	While	 this	





end	 objective	 of	 bringing	 the	 ‘barbarians’	 to	 a	 standard	 of	 civilisation.	While	 from	Mill’s	
reasoning	 the	 barbarians	 had	 no	 international	 legal	 rights	 as	 a	 nation,	 he	 believed	 they	
should,	 at	 the	 earliest	 possible	 opportunity,	 obtain	 the	 necessary	 conditions	 to	 become	


















Mill’s	 perspective,	 there	were	 clear	 limitations	 to	 the	 civilising	 role	 of	 Europeans,	 as	 he	 believed	 that	 it	was	






between	 civilised	 nations	 are	 to	 be	 governed	 by	 the	 principle	 of	 equality,	 whereas	 the	
relations	between	civilised	and	‘barbarian’	peoples	were	hierarchical,	centred	on	the	notion	
that	 the	barbarians	were	 somehow	 ‘different’.	 It	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 characterisations	of	 the	
civilised	versus	barbarous	nations	were	employed	as	an	exclusionary	tactic	during	Mill’s	time,	
which	attempted	to	justify	and	legitimise	intervention	against	peoples	deemed	to	be	on	the	
periphery	 of	 international	 relations.	 It	 is	 Mill’s	 assumption	 that	 there	 existed	 a	 rank	 of	
societies,	on	a	scale	of	civilisation,	which	determined	whether	you	were	afforded	the	rights	
to	so-called	universal	principles	of	equality	and	liberty.	Contemporary	scholars,	such	as	Beate	
Jahn,	 have	 argued	 that	 Mill’s	 philosophy	 was,	 “rooted	 in	 a	 need	 to	 justify	 the	 political	
inequality	of	humanity	on	cultural	grounds.”107	Political	 theorist,	Bhikhu	Parekh,	 takes	this	
idea	even	 further,	with	 the	assertion	 that	Mill’s	articulations	had	 the	effect	of	creating	“a	
Manichean	theory	of	two	worlds,	one	is	an	area	of	light,	the	other	that	of	darkness,	one	is	




















                                                
not	and	cannot	exist.”	Mill	was	of	 the	opinion	that	 if	 the	colonial	populations	did	not	have	“sufficient	 love	of	
liberty	to	be	able	to	wrest	it	from	merely	domestic	oppressors,”	then	the	liberty	bestowed	on	them	by	outside	











This	 chapter	 has	 traced	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 preeminent	 discourse	 on	 the	 standard	 of	
civilisation	 from	 the	 thirteenth	 through	 until	 the	 late	 nineteenth	 century.	 In	 commentary	
which	was	first	advanced	by	Pope	Innocent	IV,	the	dominant	discourse	promoted	across	this	
time	 period	 was	 the	 theory	 that	 exceptionality	 existed	 in	 international	 relations,	 where	
certain	peoples,	by	virtue	of	their	perceived	uncivilised	status,	were	not	afforded	protection	
from	external	intervention	and	interference.	The	standard	of	civilisation	was	employed	with	
the	 clear	objective	of	 creating	a	hierarchical	 international	 system,	whereby	 the	 casting	of	
peoples	 as	 ‘barbarians’	 and	 ‘different’	was	 an	 attempt	 to	 legitimise	 violent	 action	 against	
them.	 Civilised	 nations,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 were	 afforded	 protection	 from	 external	
intervention,	owing	to	the	comity	of	nations	and	the	governing	principle	that	equality	among	
them	 should	 regulate	 their	 conduct.	 Due	 to	 their	 ‘civilised’	 status,	 the	 norm	 of	 non-
intervention	afforded	them	protection	from	interference	by	external	forces.	
By	 the	 eighteenth	 century,	 any	 intervention	 against	 ‘civilised’	 western	 European	






preventing	 non-Europeans	 from	 shaping	 the	 development	 of	 contemporary	 international	
law.111	 This	meant	 that	 from	 the	 infancy	 of	 the	 international	 legal	 system,	 non-European	
values	and	norms	were	sidelined,	while	European	ones	were	held	to	be	‘universal,’	both	in	




of	 protection	 for	 indigenous	 populations	 against	 the	 violent	 actions	 of	 colonisers	 and	
conquerors.	These	attempts	can	certainly	be	found	in	Innocent	and	Vitoria’s	theorising	on	the	
natural	rights	of	man,	and	also	 in	the	rights	promoted	by	Enlightenment-era	thinkers.	The	
theoretical	 perspectives	 analysed	during	 this	 timeframe	 indicate	 that	 thought	was	 indeed	
given	 to	 the	need	 to	better	protect	 those	deemed	 to	be	on	 the	 ‘outside’	of	 international	
                                                
110	Jean-Jacques	Rousseau,	“The	State	of	War,”	in	Rousseau	on	International	Relations,	eds.	Stanley	Hoffmann	and	
David	P.	Fidler	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1991),	33.	





society.	However,	 time	and	again,	 exceptions	 to	universal	principles	 and	non-intervention	








in	 this	 chapter	 has	 had	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	 later	 discourse	 on	 intervention	 and	 the	
standard	of	civilisation.	As	Anghie	argues,	early	theologians,	such	as	Francisco	de	Vitoria,	were	
significant	 contributors	 to	 the	 development	 of	 a	 set	 of	 concepts	 and	 arguments	 which	
continue	to	be	employed	by	major	powers	in	contemporary	international	relations.113	From	
Anghie’s	 perspective,	 these	 concepts,	 “are	 simultaneously	 used	 to	 describe	 and	 evaluate,	
compare	and	contrast,	commend	and	condemn.”114	The	manner	in	which	international	law	
was	wielded	in	the	narrative	of	liberal	internationalism,	which	represents	itself	as	the	“legal	
conscience	 of	 the	 civilized	 world,”115	 also	 has	 resonance	 in	 contemporary	 international	






















Serious	 challenges	 to	 the	 standard	 of	 civilisation	 project	 emerged	 in	 the	 early	 twentieth	
century,	with	significant	shifts	in	the	understanding	of	who	in	the	international	system	could	










the	 ‘barbarian’	 was	 seen	 to	 be	 dominantly	 inside	 the	 borders	 of	 Europe.	 This	 arguably	
changed	 the	 way	 that	 Europeans	 saw	 themselves,	 and	 also	 had	 an	 impact	 on	 their	
understanding	of	the	nature	of	people	outside	of	Europe.		
Following	 both	 world	 wars,	 there	 were	 concerted	 attempts	 to	 create	 a	 peaceful	
international	 environment,	 based	 on	 liberal	 and	 idealistic	 beliefs	 in	 a	 common	 humanity,	
universal	human	rights,	and	 the	possibility	of	a	harmony	of	 interests	among	states.	These	
periods	 will	 be	 examined,	 with	 a	 particular	 focus	 on	 the	 attempt	 to	 internationalise	 the	
control	of	colonial	territories,	firstly	under	the	auspices	of	the	League	of	Nations,	and	later	
under	the	United	Nations	(UN).	While	the	two	international	systems	of	controlling	colonies,	
and	 the	 peoples	 in	 them,	 were	 touted	 to	 represent	 significant	 changes	 to	 the	 relations	
between	those	once	deemed	the	‘civilised’	and	the	‘barbarians,’		it	is	clear	that	the	casting	of	
certain	peoples	in	terms	of	civililisation	continued	to	shape	the	understanding	of	permissible	






Over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 a	 number	 of	 scholars	 and	 theorists	 began	 to	
seriously	 challenge	 the	 liberal	 and	universal	 principles	which	were	purported	 to	underpin	
colonialism	 and	 civilising	 missions.	 One	 such	 scholar	 was	 John	 A.	 Hobson,	 an	 English	
economist	and	social	scientist,	who	wrote	at	the	beginning	of	the	twentieth	century.	Hobson	





illegitimate.”117	 Hobson	 argued	 that	 intervention	 was	 justifiable	 if	 civilised	 nations	 were	
acting,	“primarily	to	secure	the	safety	and	progress	of	the	civilisation	of	the	world,”118	and	if	
they	were	also,	“acting	 for	 the	 real	good	of	 the	subject	 race.”119	However,	where	Hobson	
departs	from	Mill	 is	 in	his	strong	belief	that	there	has	never	been	a	legitimate	example,	 in	
either	historical	or	contemporary	discourse,	where	the	“theory	of	white	government,”	has	
truly	sought	to	secure	the	interests	of	the	“governed	peoples”	in	the	colonies.120	Indeed,	from	
Hobson’s	perspective,	 the	 so-called	 ‘civilised	nations’	of	 the	early	 twentieth	 century	were	





are	owned	by	white	aliens	and	worked	by	natives	under	 their	direction,	primarily	 for	 their	
gain:	they	do	not	identify	themselves	with	the	interest	of	the	country	or	its	people,	but	remain	








relations.	 The	 utility	 of	 employing	 a	 classical	 realist	 perspective,	 to	 understand	 the	
motivations	 of	 state	 behaviour	 and	 provide	 a	 critique	 of	 the	 liberal	 underpinnings	 of	 the	
standard	of	civilisation	discourse,	will	be	examined	in	closer	detail	in	an	upcoming	section	of	
this	chapter.	
















While	 from	 Hobson’s	 perspective,	 intervention	 against	 ‘lower	 races,’	 could	
theoretically	 be	 legitimate	 under	 narrow	 circumstances,	 he	 limited	 the	 possibility	 of	
intervention	 being	 carried	 out	 even	 further	 by	 arguing	 that	 in	 order	 for	 it	 to	 be	 deemed	
legitimate,	 it	 would	 need	 to	 be	 carried	 out	 by	 “an	 organised	 representative	 of	 civilised	
humanity.”123	Hobson	had	recognised	that	states	had	consistently	demonstrated	patterns	of	
self-centric	 and	 self-serving	 action,	 and	 as	 a	 result	 he	 was	 not	 willing	 to	 lay	 legitimate	
intervention	in	the	hands	of	individual	states.	Hobson	was	of	the	opinion	that	until	a	“genuine	





	Despite	 his	 apparent	 championing	 of	 the	 idea	 of	 the	 creation	 of	 an	 overarching	
sovereign	power	in	the	international	system,	Hobson	went	on	to	acknowledge	that	he	had	
strong	 reservations	 about	 the	 probable	 success	 of	 a	 genuine	 international	 council.	 It	was	
Hobson’s	 fear	 that	 “self-chosen	oligarchs	among	 the	nations,”	may	attempt	 to	deride	 the	
process,	“under	the	cloak	of	the	civilising	mission,”	and	furthermore,	these	civilised	nations	
may	learn	to	live	parasitically	on	the	lower	races,	and	impose	on	them	fraudulent	acts,	in	the	
name	of	 the	 lower	 races	 “own	good.”125	Hobson	 further	 feared	 that	 collusion	would	 take	
place	among	the	dominant	nations	of	the	time,	in	order	to	wield	control	over	the	international	
council,	for	their	own	self-interest.126	Hobson	called	this	fear,	“the	largest	and	gravest	peril	of	
the	 early	 future.”127	 It	 is	 clear,	 again,	 in	 Hobson’s	 theorising	 that	 he	 is	 demonstrating	 a	
































‘barbarians’	 were	 not	 exclusively	 on	 the	 ‘outside,’	 and	 in	 the	 colonies.	 Indeed,	 E.H	 Carr	
recognised	that	the	onset	of	World	War	I	bought	with	it	a	changing	perception	of	who	was	
civilised	and	who	was	uncivilised.	From	his	perspective,	the	reality	of	war	and	conflict	had	





of	 Europe	 laid	 a	 challenge	 to	 the	 belief	 of	 the	 civilisational	 superiority	 of	 white	 western	




I	 had	 resulted	 in	 the	 challenging	 of	 the	 belief	 that	 advanced	 civilisation	 could	 only	 be	
European.134	In	the	aftermath	of	this	unprecedented	total	war,	so	shocked	were	people	that	
this	level	of	brutality	and	violence	could	occur	in	Europe,	and	be	perpetrated	by	Europeans,	
that	 there	 were	 calls	 for	 the	 creation	 of	 an	 overarching	 international	 governing	 body	 to	
ensure	that	devastation	on	this	scale	would	not	occur	again.135	The	League	of	Nations	was	
                                                
129	 See	 for	 example	 Woodrow	Wilson,	 “Joint	 Address	 to	 Congress	 Leading	 to	 a	 Declaration	 of	 War	 Against	
























peace	 and	 order.137	 Underpinning	 this	 Wilsonian	 or	 utopian	 theory,	 was	 a	 faith	 that	
“regardless	of	race	or	religion,”	fundamental	and	universal	principles	of	rights	would	create	a	










spread	 of	 knowledge	would	 soon	make	 it	 possible	 for	 everyone	 to	 reason	 rightly	 on	 this	
important	subject,	and	that	anyone	who	reasoned	rightly	on	it	would	necessarily	act	right.”141	
In	order	 to	achieve	 this	harmony	of	 interests	 in	 the	 international	 system,	and	 in	order	 to	



















of	 international	 law,”	become,	“the	actual	 rule	of	conduct	among	the	governments	of	 the	













which	were	 so	 strongly	 argued	 to	underpin	 the	 creation	of	 the	 League,	 the	question	was	
raised	as	to	what	should	be	done	with	the	colonial	possessions	of	the	defeated	states	of	World	




weight.”147	 For	many,	Wilson’s	 idealism	was	 an	 inspiring	 rallying	 call	 for	 human	 equality,	
where	he	appeared	to	condemn	the	misuse	of	political	power	in	the	colonies,	and	the	unequal	
voice	 afforded	 to	 those	 living	 under	 colonial	 rule.148	 An	 expectation	 was	 generated	 that	
something	 ‘new’	needed	 to	be	done,	 to	deal	with	 the	colonial	 territories.	As	Koskenniemi	
asserts,	these	territories	grew	to	represent,	“a	form	of	colonial	administration	[which	could]	
no	longer	be	carried	out	by	single	colonial	sovereigns,	but	by	the	international	community.”149	






















engage	 in	 self-governance,	 and	 thus	 proposed	 that	 external	 states,	 namely	 the	 victorious	
Allied	 Forces,	 should	 be	 endowed	 with	 the	 responsibility	 to	 administer	 their	 affairs.150	
According	to	Smuts,	as	a	result	of	the	variances	in	the	conditions	of	life	in	the	colonies,	the	
degree	of	the	‘guiding	hand’	by	the	external	state	would	need	to	vary	considerably.151	In	his	
view,	 the	German	colonies	 in	 the	Pacific	and	Africa	were	 identified	as	 requiring	particular	
attention,	 as	 they	 were	 “inhabited	 by	 barbarians,	 who	 not	 only	 cannot	 possibly	 govern	




system	 for	 controlling	 colonial	 territories,	 which	 would	 be	 called	 the	 League	 of	 Nations	
Mandate	System.	
Under	Article	 22	 of	 the	 Covenant	 of	 the	 League	 of	Nations,	 it	was	 decreed	 that	 a	
system	would	be	created	whereby	the	colonies	and	territories	which	were	no	longer	under	
the	sovereign	control	of	the	losing	states	of	World	War	I	would	be	held	in	a	“sacred	trust	of	
civilisation.”153	 Owing	 to	 their	 inability	 to	 “stand	 by	 themselves	 under	 the	 strenuous	
conditions	of	the	modern	world,”154	these	territories	would	be	entrusted	to	the	tutelage	of	
so-called	 ‘advanced	nations,’	 namely	 the	 victors	 of	World	War	 I.	 The	 League	 agreed	with	
Smuts’	 assessment	 that	 the	 character	 and	 level	 of	 control	 wielded	 over	 the	 mandate	
territories	would	need	to	differ,	based	on	an	assessment	of	their	stage	of	development,	their	
economic	 conditions,	 and	 the	 geographical	 location	of	 the	 territory.155	 The	assessment	of	






















                                                
and	assistance	would	only	be	until	such	time	that	they	would	be	able	to	“stand	alone.”	The	second	category	(B)	






















































be	 based	 strongly	 on	Wilsonian	 idealism	 and	 the	 liberal	 principles	 of	 self-determination,	
liberty,	and	humanitarianism.	While	this	process	was	largely	contracted	out	to	the	victors	of	
World	War	 I,	 in	order	to	retain	some	oversight	over	 the	process,	Wilson	dictated	that	 the	










internationalised	 system	of	protection.	Wilson	was	 reportedly	 so	proud	of	 the	drafting	of	
Article	 22	 that	 he	 proclaimed	 that	 a	 system	 had	 been	 created	 whereby	 territorial	
aggrandisement	and	exploitation	of	“the	world’s	most	disadvantaged	peoples,”	would	finally	
come	to	an	end.159		
For	Will	 J.	Selzer,	 the	mandate	system	represented	a	 fundamental	shift	 in	how	the	
Western	nations	acted	towards	the	colonies,	as	“moral	obligations	were	translated	into	legal	







process	 regarding	which	of	 the	administrating	states	would	have	control	over	each	of	 the	
colonial	territories.	










and	control	over	 the	mandate	 territories	demonstrated	early	on	 that	state	 interest	 in	 this	
process	was	not	overly	altruistic,	nor	 truly	based	on	Wilson’s	utopian	universal	principles.	
Who	 got	 to	 control	 which	 of	 the	 colonial	 territories	 was	 a	 process	 of	 intense	 political	
wrangling	 and	 contention.	 Analysis	 of	 these	 deliberations	 demonstrates	 that	 there	 were	
numerous	occasions	where	the	 ‘advanced	nations’	were	not	overly	 interested	 in	who	was	
best	 suited	 to	 assist	 the	 development	 of	 the	 individual	 mandate	 territories,	 rather	 their	
arguments	over	who	obtained	control	were	centred	primarily	on	notions	of	self-interest	and	
security	concerns.		
One	prime	example	of	 this	 taking	place	can	be	 found	 in	 the	 report	 that	Australian	
Prime	Minister,	William	Hughes,	 spoke	 forcefully	 about	Australia’s	 claim	 to	 the	 largest	 of	
Germany’s	 Pacific	 Islands,	 New	 Guinea.	 Prime	Minister	 Hughes	maintained	 that	 Australia	
could	not	be	at	peace	if	New	Guinea	was	in	the	hands	of	another	power,	whether	that	be	an	
European	ally,	or	even	in	the	hands	of	the	League	of	Nations.162	Hughes	had	argued	with	his	




were	on	 the	 spot.”164	Absent	 from	these	assertions	was	 the	claim	 that	Canberra	was	best	
placed	to	assist	in	the	development	of	the	people	of	New	Guinea.	So	assured	of	his	country’s	










against	 those	 under	 their	 tutelage	 as	 the	 ‘uncivilised	 barbarians.’	 An	 examination	 of	 the	













he	 was	 fiercely	 critical	 of	 the	 “pursuit	 of	 imperialistic	 policies”	 during	 the	 bargaining	 for	
control	over	the	mandates,	where	the	‘advanced	nations,’	had	been	“inspired	by	economic	
imperialism	of	 the	 crudest	 kind.”167	 So	much	 for	 the	 sacred	 trust	of	 civilisation,	Dickinson	
lamented.168	While	this	continued	to	be	the	case,	Dickinson	argued	that	the	Covenant	of	the	
League	 could	never	be	anything	more	 than	 “a	piece	of	 solemn	hypocrisy.”169	 In	 complete	
agreement	 with	 Dickinson’s	 position,	 Woolf	 noted	 that	 the	 mandate	 system	 was	 clearly	
intended	 to	 be	 used	 as	 a	 “cloak	 of	 fine	 phrases	 to	 cover	 the	 nakedness	 of	 the	 older	
imperialism,	to	continue	the	subjection	and	exploitation…under	the	new	name	of	a	sacred	
trust	 instead	of	 that	of	a	 Joint	Stock	Company.”170	 It	certainly	appeared	that	 the	mandate	
system	simply	perpetuated	what	had	already	existed	in	international	relations,	whereby	the	




















and	 the	Axis	 Powers.	Allied	 leaders	 regularly	 described	Adolf	Hitler	 as	 being	barbaric	 and	
claimed	that	Nazism	posed	the	greatest	threat	to	‘civilisation’.173	On	the	opposing	side,	Hitler	
referenced	 the	violence	and	oppression	 conducted	 in	 the	British	 colonies	as	providing	his	











the	 era	 of	 conquest	 and	 colonisation,	 the	 actions	 of	 both	 sides	 of	 the	 war	 required	 the	
discursive	practice	of	 ‘othering,’	whereby	 the	 ‘enemy	other’	was	 vilified	 and	described	as	
subhuman,	 in	order	 to	 legitimise	the	violence	necessary	to	defeat	 them.	 In	regards	to	the	
Third	Reich,	“Jews,	Sinti	and	Roma,	homosexuals,	Poles,	and	communists	were	represented	






The	 application	 of	 colonial	 language	 and	 practices	 during	 both	World	Wars	 had	 a	
significant	 impact	on	standard	of	civilisation	discourse.	 In	 the	end,	 the	clear	demarcations	
between	the	European	‘civilised’	and	the	non-European	‘uncivilised,’	which	had	endured	even	
before	 the	 time	of	 Pope	 Innocent	 IV,	was	 seriously	 challenged.	 The	 level	 of	 brutality	 and	
violence	 conducted	made	 it	 problematic	 to	 attempt	 to	 return	 to	 the	 previously	 simplistic	
colonialist	dichotomy	of	 the	civilised	coloniser	versus	the	barbarian	colonised.	 Indeed,	 the	
actions	that	had	once	made	colonial	subjects	appear	‘uncivilised’	prior	to	the	war,	such	as	the	












were	 left,	again,	with	a	decision	 to	make	as	 to	what	needed	to	be	done	with	 the	colonial	
territories.	 It	 appeared	 that	 an	 opportunity	 had	 arisen	 whereby	 outdated	 dichotomised	
civilisational	discourse	and	actions	could	be	finally	be	done	away	with.	Optimism	appeared	to	






















from	 the	 scourge	 of	 war,	 which	 twice	 in	 our	 lifetime	 has	 brought	 untold	 sorrow	 to	
mankind.”178	This	second	attempt	in	the	twentieth	century	at	an	overarching	international	
institution	was	also	strongly	underpinned	by	professed	universal	liberal	principles,	previously	
firmly	 promoted	 by	 Enlightenment	 thinkers	 and	 then	 later	 by	Wilsonian	 utopianism.	 The	
second	 line	 of	 the	 Preamble	 of	 the	 Charter	 outlines	 this	 clearly,	 where	 it	 reaffirms	 the	



































advancement	of	 the	 trust	 territories,	with	 the	goal	being	 their	development	 towards	 self-




























                                                
182	Refer	to	the	table	below	for	details	on	the	trust	territories,	as	well	as	their	respective	administrative	powers.	







                                                
185	 Information	 on	 trust	 territories	 and	 administrative	 powers	 was	 gathered	 from:	 The	 United	 Nations,	 “The	














































































































between	 the	 ‘civilised’	 and	 the	 ‘uncivilised’	was	 still	 at	 play,	 even	 if	 no	 longer	 specifically	
articulated	 in	 those	 terms.189	 Indeed,	 Koskenniemi	 observes	 that	 the	 mandate	 and	








century.	 In	 practice,	 domination	 and	 exploitation	 of	 peoples	 considered	 outside	 of	 the	




the	 civilised	 coloniser	 versus	 the	 barbarian	 colonised,	 but	 this	 did	 not	 mean	 that	 the	
hierarchal	nature	of	 the	 international	 system	changed	 in	any	meaningful	way.	Protections	
were	continued	 to	be	afforded	 to	 the	privileged	 in	 the	system	(namely	 the	United	States,	
western	Europe,	and	their	Allies),	while	the	rest	of	the	world	continued	to	be	dominated	and	
controlled	 by	 the	 ‘civilised,’	 or	 in	 the	more	 palatable	 language	 of	 the	 ‘democratic,	 peace	
loving	nations.’	 International	 law	 continued	 to	be	wielded	as	 a	mechanism	 to	ensure	 this	
domination	and	control	was	sustained.	While	no	longer	carried	out	with	explicit	reference	to	
                                                
186	Antony	Anghie,	“Time	Present	and	Time	Past:	Globalisation,	International	Financial	Institutions,	and	the	Third	
World,”	New	York	University	Journal	of	International	Law	and	Politics	32,	no.2	(2000):	278.	










reproduced	 and	 rebranded	 under	 new	 forms	 of	 international	 law	 and	 international	
institutions.	In	the	analysis	to	follow,	the	classical	realist	critique	of	these	twentieth	century	









that	 purported	 acts	 of	 liberal	 ‘moral	 universalism,’	 and	 the	 interventionist	 logic	 which	
accompanied	it,	had	damaging	effects	on	the	international	system.	In	particular,	it	was	argued	
that	a	system	of	viewing	international	relations,	whereby	there	was	an	acceptance	of	the	facts	





















of	 the	 world.”193	 Furthermore,	 the	 invocation	 of	 ‘humanity’	 as	 an	 all	 encompassing	 and	















ultimately	 lead	 to	 the	 dehumanisation	 of	 the	 ‘enemy	 other,’	 which	 would	 make	 conflict	
against	them	appear	more	permissible	and	intense.197	This	process	has	strong	parallels	to	the	






between	 realism	 and	 liberalism	 (including	 their	 various	 sub-branches)	 endures	 in	
international	 relations	 today.	 Indeed,	 French	 historian	 Albert	 Sorel	 foresaw	 this	 enduring	
battle	 occurring,	 when	 he	 argued	 as	 early	 as	 the	 1870s	 that	 there	would	 be	 an	 “eternal	
dispute	between	those	who	imagine	the	world	to	suit	their	policy,	and	those	who	arrange	
their	policy	to	suit	the	realities	of	the	world.”200	In	this	context,	this	chapter	will	examine	the	











warning	 of	 the	 dangers	 of	 the	 utopian	 liberalism	 of	 the	 inter-war	 period.	 From	 Carr’s	
perspective,	he	 saw	 the	crisis	of	 the	 twenty	years	between	1919	and	1939	as	being,	 “the	
abrupt	descent	from	the	visionary	hopes	of	the	first	decade	to	the	grim	despair	of	the	second,	
from	a	utopia	which	took	little	account	of	reality,	to	a	reality	from	which	every	element	of	
utopia	was	 rigorously	 excluded.”202	 In	 this	 regard,	 Carr	was	heavily	 critical	 of	 the	utopian	






















real	 life	 of	 the	 state,	 it	 remained	 a	 dead	 letter,	 did	 not	 penetrate	 the	 consciousness	 of	




It	 was	 Carr’s	 argument	 that	 the	 “utopian	 stage”	 of	 political	 science,	 so	 fervently	
supported	by	Wilson	and	his	liberal	devotees,	was	in	fact	simply	an	“initial	stage”	or	“infant	
science”	of	political	theory.206	During	this	stage,	Carr	argued	that	the	liberal	advocates	would	
pay	 “little	 attention	 to	 the	 analysis	 of	 cause	 and	 effect;”	 rather,	 they	would	 devote	 their	
energies	to	the	elaboration	of	purported	visionary	projects,	“whose	simplicity	and	perfection	
give	them	an	easy	and	universal	appeal.”207	In	this	regard,	attention	would	be	concentrated	
nearly	 entirely	 on	 the	 end	 alleged	 to	 be	 achieved.	 Carr	 noted	 that	 the	 end	 appeared	 so	
important	to	the	liberal,	that	any	analytical	criticism	of	the	means	of	achieving	it	would	likely	
be	 “branded	 as	 destructive	 and	 unhelpful.”208	 From	 Carr’s	 perspective,	 the	 reliance	 and	
adherence	to	the	utopian	ideals	of	this	stage	facilitated	the	return	to	war	in	the	1930s.	It	was	
the	 bankruptcy	 of	 the	 foundations	 of	 twentieth	 century	 liberalism	 that	 had	 made	 the	
international	system	untenable,	and	it	was	not	at	all	surprising	to	Carr	that	war	confronted	
the	world	again.	When	these	liberal	‘visionary	projects’	ultimately	broke	down,	because	of	




















capacity	 as	 Colonial	 Secretary	 of	 State	 for	 France	 in	 1923,	 Sarraut’s	 position	 can	 be	
summarised	in	the	following:	
What	is	the	use	of	painting	the	truth?	At	the	start,	colonisation	was	not	an	act	of	civilisation,	

















that	 the	 entire	 League	 of	 Nations	 project	 was	 doomed	 to	 fail,	 as	 “the	 unruly	 flow	 of	
international	 politics,”	 could	 never	 be	dealt	 successfully	 by	 the	 “formulae	 inspired	by	 the	




particularly	 of	 the	 view	 that	 the	 organisation	 could	 eliminate	 power	 politics	 from	
international	relations.		
















and	 challenge	 their	 ascendance	 in	 the	 international	 system.	 Indeed,	 as	 Jeremy	 Moses	
comments	 in	 his	 analysis	 of	 Carr,	 the	 ultimate	 ends	 of	 utopian	 liberalism,	 when	 viewed	
through	Carr’s	lens,	“lay	not	in	the	promise	of	perpetual	peace,	but	in	the	maintenance	and	
expansion	of	a	particular	constellation	of	power.”216		








of	 morally	 discrediting	 one’s	 enemy,	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 justifying	 one’s	 own,	 was	
abundantly	widespread	in	the	early	twentieth	century.	According	to	Carr,	
To	depict	one’s	enemies	or	one’s	prospective	victims	as	inferior	beings	in	the	sight	of	God	has	






that	 during	 World	 War	 I,	 this	 type	 of	 conviction	 was	 carried,	 “to	 a	 pitch	 of	 emotional	























War	 I	 Germany,	 and	 is	 considered	 one	 of	 the	 leading	 critics	 of	 liberalism,	 as	 well	 as	 the	
purported	 universal	 moral	 principles	 which	 accompany	 it.	 His	 critique	 of	 liberalism	 and	
parliamentary	democracy	primarily	 inspired	his	work	in	The	Concept	of	the	Political,	which	
George	Schwab	calls	“undoubtedly	one	of	the	most	important	tracts	of	political	thought	of	
the	 twentieth	 century.”224	 Schmitt’s	 association	 with	 Nazism,	 however,	 resulted	 in	 a	
“shadow”	 over	 his	 life,	 and	 the	 discrediting	 of	 some	 of	 his	 writings	 from	 that	 period.225	
However,	 this	 association	 fails	 to	 weaken	 the	 strength	 of	 his	 insights	 on	 the	 dangers	 of	
liberalism,	utopianism,	and	universalistic	humanitarian	rhetoric.	Indeed,	Moses	argues	that	it	




invocation	of	 the	 language	of	 humanity,	 by	 liberal	 leaders	 such	 as	Wilson,	would	 actually	
make	it	possible	for	people	to	be	“driven	to	the	most	extreme	inhumanity.”227	In	an	argument	
similar	 to	 that	 of	 Carr’s,	 Schmitt	 believed	 that	 by	 invoking	 the	 term	 humanity,	 there	
necessarily	would	be	the	creation	of	the	‘enemy	other,’	who	would	thus	be	removed	from	
humanity	altogether.228	This	would	result	in	violent	and	abhorrent	actions	being	committed	
against	 the	 enemy,	 which	 under	 ‘normal’	 circumstances	 would	 be	 unlawful	 under	
international	 law.	 In	 a	 similar	 pattern	 to	 what	 occurred	 during	 the	 colonisation	 period,	
methods	 of	 warfare	 and	 violence,	 which	 had	 long	 disappeared	 from	 use	 against	 fellow	
Europeans,	were	now,	again,	 considered	 legitimate	 in	 the	 face	of	 the	enemy	who	did	not	
seem	to	subscribe	to	the	same	cultural	code.229	Of	interest	here	is	how	identity	is	politicised	
by	political	 leaders,	 particularly	 in	 times	of	 conflict	 and	war,	 in	order	 to	 elicit	 support	 for	
increasing	levels	of	violent	actions.	Thus,	according	to	Schmitt:	




























It	 is	 in	 the	 context	of	 Schmitt’s	belief	 in	 the	dangers	of	 the	 concept	of	 a	universal	
humanity,	that	he	was	highly	critical	of	the	League	of	Nations.	For	Schmitt,	the	League	did	not	
represent	humanity,	 it	was	not	universal,	nor	was	 it	 truly	an	 international	organisation.235	
Indeed,	 because	 the	 League	 was	 underpinned	 by	 purported	 universal	 principles,	 Schmitt	
argued	that	it	introduced		“new	possibilities	for	wars,	permits	wars	to	take	place,	sanctions	




and	enemy	 liberated	the	Great	Powers	and	the	League	 from	restraint	 in	dealing	with	 ‘the	
enemy.’238	While	 liberals	 claimed	 that	 the	League	could	positively	 ‘depoliticise’	 the	world,	
through	 the	 aid	 of	 definitions	 and	 constructions	 such	 as	 that	 of	 a	 ‘common	 humanity,’		
Schmitt	 argued	 that	 it	was	 foolish	 and	deceptive	 to	disregard	 the	 centrality	of	 states	 and	
politics	in	international	relations.239	Instead,	Schmitt	viewed	liberal	thought	as	a	disingenuous	





























the	most	 influential	 theorists	on	political	 realism	 in	 the	post-World	War	 II	period.	He	was	
strongly	influenced	by	the	work	of	both	Carr	and	Schmitt,	with	Morgenthau’s	1929	university	
dissertation	being	 conceived	partly	 as	 a	 reply	 to	 Schmitt’s	The	Concept	 of	 the	 Political.243	
Morgenthau’s	 own	 work	 in	 Politics	 Among	 Nations	 became	 pivotal	 to	 the	 evolution	 of	
classical	realism	in	the	post-World	War	II	era.	Like	Carr	and	Schmitt	before	him,	Morgenthau	
was	 heavily	 critical	 of	 utopianism	 symptomatic	 of	 the	 post-World	War	 I	 era,	 and	 of	 the	
universal	moral	rhetoric	which	accompanied	it.	Morgenthau	continued	his	criticism	of	liberal	











nations”	versus	 the	“forces	of	evil,”	 leaving	 the	only	policy	option	available:	“to	crush	 the	
enemy;	 force	 him	 into	 unconditional	 surrender;	 [and]	 re-educate	 him	 in	 the	 ways	 of	
democratic,	 peace-loving	 nations.”246	 Morgenthau,	 like	 Schmitt,	 argued	 that	 this	 process	
















and	 the	 ‘righteous,’	 in	 the	 absolute	 good	 versus	 absolute	 evil	 dichotomy.248	Morgenthau	
viewed	this	as	the	practice	whereby	“the	moral	code	of	one	nation	flings	the	challenge	of	its	
universal	claim	with	messianic	fervor	into	the	face	of	another,	which	reciprocates	in	kind.”249	








continued	 his	 criticism	 of	 the	 universal	 morality	 argued	 to	 underpin	 liberal	 international	
theory.	Morgenthau	had	been	influenced	by	Carr	and	Schmitt’s	views	on	the	dangers	of	the	
liberal	attempt	to	shape	international	law	in	order	to	‘depoliticise’	the	international	system.	
From	 Morgenthau’s	 perspective,	 depoliticisation	 was	 actually	 a	 political	 calculation	 by	






to	 support	 the	 particular	 policies	 they	were	 pursuing.254	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 policies	 of	 these	
states,	 each	 claiming	 to	 be	 representative	 of	 the	 universal	 conscious	 of	 all,	 became	
contradictory,	as	each	state	was	in	truth	attempting	to	conceal	its	true	character	under	the	
guise	 of	 universality.255	 In	many	 cases,	 the	 ‘messianic	 fervour’	 of	 the	moralism	 argued	 to	













underpin	 the	 foreign	policy	of	nations,	became	so	consuming	 that	 these	nations	began	to	
believe	 their	 own	 rhetoric,	 which	Morgenthau	 viewed	 as	 being	 particularly	 dangerous.256	
Morgenthau’s	belief	in	this	practice	can	be	aptly	summarised	in	the	following:		  
Thus,	 carrying	 their	 idols	 before	 them,	 the	 nationalistic	 masses	 of	 our	 time	 meet	 in	 the	
international	arena,	each	group	convinced	that	it	executes	the	mandate	of	history,	that	it	does	





preconceptions	 of	 a	 particular	 nation.258	 From	Morgenthau’s	 perspective,	 the	 UN	 would	
always	be	beholden	to	the	interests	of	the	powerful	states	in	the	international	system,	and	
therefore	 it	 could	 never	 truly	 have	 the	 authority	 and	 power	 to	 control	 and	 dictate	 state	
behaviour.	The	UN,	in	Morgenthau’s	view,	would	never	be	the	true	‘sovereign.’	The	basic	fact	
of	international	politics	was	“the	absence	of	a	society	able	to	protect	the	existence,	and	to	




In	 their	 assessments	 of	 the	 dangers	 of	 liberal	 international	 theory,	 Carr,	 Schmitt,	 and	
Morgenthau,	all	called	for	greater	emphasis	to	be	given	to	the	acceptance	of	facts	and	reality,	
and	on	the	analysis	of	their	causes	and	consequences.	The	task	of	the	realist,	as	Carr	put	it,	
was	 to	 “bring	 down	 the	 whole	 cardboard	 structure	 of	 utopian	 thought	 by	 exposing	 the	
hollowness	of	the	material	out	of	which	it	is	built.”260	In	this	regard,	each	of	these	classical	
realist	theorists	argued	that	political	realism	should	be	used	to	thoroughly	undermine	liberal	

















law	 was	 controlled	 and	 employed	 in	 the	 narrative	 of	 liberal	 international	 theory	 was	
especially	 concerning.	 There	 is	 certainly	 evidence	 to	 suggest	 that	 expressions	 of	 moral	
responsibility	and	universal	values,	often	through	the	auspices	of	 international	 institutions	
and	international	law,	misrepresented	and	concealed	what	was	happening	in	reality.	Whether	









territories	 as	 being	 outside	 of	 humanity,	 as	 it	 inevitably	 made	 them	 vulnerable	 to	 the	
imperialistic	ambitions	of	powerful	states,	and	made	international	conflict	more	possible.	
In	the	context	of	this	thesis,	there	is	great	interest	in	the	patterns	that	these	classical	
realists	 observed.	 Throughout	 the	 early	 to	mid-twentieth	 century,	 there	 appears	 to	 be	 a	
consistent	 and	 repetitive	 process	 of	 the	 use	 of	 universal	 moral	 rhetoric	 to	 create	 the	






of	 non-intervention	 could	 be	 discarded,	 if	 and	 when,	 it	 suited	 the	 Allied	 Forces	 armies.	
Evident,	also,	is	a	strong	correlation	between	the	language	employed	to	justify	intervention	
in	the	twentieth	century,	and	that	of	standard	of	civilisation	discourse	identified	throughout	




These	 processes	 appear	 to	 be	 continuing	 in	 contemporary	 international	 relations.	
Indeed,	 the	 use	 of	 international	 law	 to	 legitimise	 intervention,	 and	 the	 subsequent	
domination	and	control	of	East	Timor	 in	the	 late	1990s	and	early	2000s	offers	a	pertinent	
example	of	this	problem.	Furthermore,	the	position	that	in	humanity	there	exists	those	with	







to	 liberal	 humanitarianism	 in	 international	 politics.	 It	 will	 also	 consider	 how	 the	 basic	
structure	of	the	civilising	missions	was	reproduced	in	East	Timor.	Indeed,	it	will	be	argued	that	
interventions	were	never	based	on	the	altruistic	notions	of	a	common	humanity,	or	universal	
human	 rights,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 East	 Timor.	 Rather,	 as	 Carr,	 Schmitt,	 and	 Morgenthau	 all	
identified,	intervention	is	symptomatic	of	calculated	assessments	of	national	interest,	and	the	


















This	 chapter	 will	 begin	 with	 an	 examination	 of	 the	 colonisation	 of	 East	 Timor	 by	
Portugal,	which	 first	 promoted	 the	 understanding	 of	 the	 inferior	 and	backward	 nature	 of	
Timorese	society.	The	invasion	and	occupation	by	Indonesia	will	then	be	explored,	with	direct	
reference	to	the	language	used	by	the	Indonesians	to	justify	and	legitimise	their	occupation	






also	 used	 to	 reinforce	 and	 justify	 their	 decisions	 to	 not	 become	 directly	 involved	 in	 the	
conflict.	 Finally,	 this	 chapter	 will	 consider	 how	 contemporary	 intervention	 in	 East	 Timor,	
through	an	Australian-led	peacekeeping	mission	and	later	a	UN	mandated	nation	and	state-
building	exercise,	also	relied	heavily	on	moralistic	and	civilisational	 language.	Of	particular	
interest	 is	how	 the	actions	of	 the	 contemporary	 interveners	demonstrated	 that	 there	are	
strong	parallels	with	 the	colonialisation	and	 the	civilising	missions	of	previous-eras.	 In	 the	
case	of	East	Timor,	it	appears	that	a	contemporary	form	of	the	standard	of	civilisation	was	
















	 During	 the	 sixteenth	 century,	 Portuguese	 presence	 in	 what	 is	 now	 known	 as	 the	
Indonesian	 archipelago	 primarily	 consisted	 of	 annual	 voyages	 to	 collect	 sandalwood	 and	
slaves,	 and	 trade	 in	 finished	 goods.265	 By	 the	 seventeenth	 century,	 it	 was	 clear	 that	

















                                                
262	Howard	J.	Wiarda,	“Portugal	in	Asia:	Ongoing	Social	and	Political	Concepts	and	Institutions,”	in	Nationbuilding	





































Lisbon’s	 political	 control	 over	 the	 colonies,	 bringing	 them	 under	 its	 direct	 rule.273	 The	
legislation	had	the	impact	of	reducing	the	already	minimal	rights	held	by	the	inhabitants	of	




two	 primary	 categories;	 the	 indigenes	 (‘unassimilated’	 natives)	 or	 the	 não	 civilizado	
                                                




















Timor	 was	 considered	 by	 Portuguese	 officials	 to	 have	 obtained	 assimilados	 status.278	
Affording	 privileged	 civilisational	 status	 to	 only	 select	 few	 in	 Timor	 also	 played	 well	 into	
Portugal’s	overall	 calculated	policy	of	divide	and	 rule,	and	helped	 them	to	 justify	violence	
against	those	they	had	deemed	being	não	civilizados.	 Indeed,	the	Timor-Leste	Commission	
for	Reception,	Truth	and	Reconciliation	later	recorded	that	the	Portuguese	colonisers’	“tactics	





book	 to	 the	outside	world.”280	What	can	be	agreed	upon,	according	 to	 Jolliffe,	 is	 that	 the	
brutal	practices	of	twentieth	century	Portuguese	colonialism	occurred	in	East	Timor.281	While	
the	Portuguese	government	claimed	that	 its	presence	in	Timor	was	based	on	its	advanced	
civilisational	 status,	 and	 its	 nurturing	 of	 the	 Timorese	 towards	 advanced	 civilisation,	 the	
reality	of	life	under	Portuguese	rule	appears	to	be	marred	by	bloody	and	violent	pacification	
operations,	 as	well	 as	 forced	 labour	practices.	As	 just	one	example,	 in	1910	 there	were	a	
number	of	large-scale	rebellions	against	the	Portuguese	in	East	Timor.	These	uprisings	were	
ultimately	violently	quelled	when	two	Portuguese	warships	were	sent	to	Timor.	It	has	been	
reported	 that	 in	 excess	 of	 3,000	 Timorese	 were	 killed,	 and	 over	 4,000	 captured	 and	
imprisoned	for	their	roles	in	the	rebellion.282	The	Timorese	involved	in	the	rebellions	reported	
that	their	efforts	were	in	response	to	the	brutality	and	subjugation	inflicted	by	their	colonial	



















a	 member	 of	 the	 Australian	War	 Graves	 Commission,	 and	 what	 he	 observed	 provides	 a	
damning	indictment	on	the	entire	Portuguese	‘civilising’	role	in	East	Timor:	











subhuman,	 inferior,	 and	 different.	 This	 process	 allowed	 Portuguese	 officials	 to	 justify	 the	
violence	required	to	conquer	and	enslave	the	Timorese,	both	to	their	domestic	constituents	
in	 Lisbon,	 and	 to	 other	 ‘advanced’	 European	 nations.	 The	 argument	 was	 made	 by	 the	


































momentum.	 East	 Timor’s	 former	 Dutch-controlled	 neighbours,	 Indonesia,	 formally	 gained	
their	independence	in	1949.292	By	1960,	a	resolution	had	been	drafted	and	agreed	upon	by	
nearly	all	members	of	the	UN	General	Assembly,293	in	which	colonialism	was	condemned	as	





legal	 thought,	 regarding	 the	 inalienable	 rights	 of	 native	 populations.	 From	 Wellsch’s	














announced	 that	 they	 had	 accepted	 the	 17	 August,	 1945	 as	 Indonesia’s	 de	 facto	 date	 of	 independence.	 See	
Government	 of	 the	 Netherlands,	 “Relations	 between	 the	 Netherlands	 and	 Indonesia,”	 Government	 of	 the	
Netherlands,	accessed	12	July,	2016.		
https://www.government.nl/topics/international-relations/contents/indonesia.	








perspective,	 “modes	 of	 tutelage	 and	 wardship	 were	 outlawed,	 and	 self-government	 was	
accepted	 as	 the	 natural	 right	 of	 all	 nations.	 Thus,	 this	 process	 officially	 ended	 the	 era	 of	
empire.”296	However,	this	view	offers	an	overly	simplistic	assessment	of	the	process,	and	fails	
to	 recognise	 the	 actual	 impact	 of	 the	 discourse	 on	 the	 decolonisation	 of	 colonial	 states.	
Indeed,	 Robert	 H.	 Jackson	 argues	 that	 in	 reality	 sovereignty	was	 still	 often	 based	 on	 the	
judgement,	 by	 the	 most	 privileged	 in	 the	 international	 system,	 of	 whether	 a	 state	 was	
‘capable’	of	providing	for	its	subjects.297	In	this	context,	the	international	system	continued	
to	be	divided	 into	 two	distinct	 tiers:	 those	deemed	to	be	capable	of	being	sovereign,	and	




It	 was	 not	 until	 the	 overthrow	 of	 Salazar’s	 regime	 in	 1974	 that	 the	 process	 of	
Portugal’s	 withdrawal	 from	 East	 Timor	 began.	 The	 new	 Portuguese	 government	 made	
decolonisation	one	of	its	priority	issues,	noting	that	the	colonies	had	been	a	significant	drain	
on	 the	 Portuguese	 economy.298	 The	 Portuguese	 government	 offered	 the	 Timorese	 three	
choices:	continued	links	with	Portugal	and	a	gradual	path	towards	independence,	integration	
with	Indonesia,	or	complete	and	rapid	independence.299	Timorese	political	parties,	which	had	
been	previously	outlawed	 in	 the	 colonies	under	 Salazar’s	 rule,	quickly	emerged.	Two	pro-
independence	parties	rapidly	gained	widespread	support,	the	União	Democrática	Timorense	
(UDT)	 and	 Frente	 Revolucionária	 de	 Timor-Leste	 Independente	 (FRETILIN),	 with	 the	 two	





the	country.	 In	1974,	Timorese	officials	 reported,	 “there	would	be	no	point	 in	our	 joining	
Indonesia	 after	 decolonisation…instead	 of	 the	 Portuguese	 over	 us	 we	 would	 have	 the	
Javanese.	 This	 would	 be	 recolonisation,	 not	 decolonisation.”300	 FRETILIN’s	 platform	 was	
strongly	based	on	the	total	rejection	of	colonialism,	and	in	its	first	party	manifesto	it	asserted	
strongly	 its	 policy	 to	 struggle	 against	 “colonialism	 and	 any	 form	 of	 domination	 of	 our	
                                                
296	 Brent	 Wellsch,	 “The	 Ethics	 of	 Reconstruction:	 The	 Dissolution	 and	 Re-emergence	 of	 Trusteeship	 Within	


















reported	 that	 some	UDT	 leaders	had	been	 in	 secret	 contact	with	high-ranking	 Indonesian	
officials,	who	had	warned	that	they	would	not	tolerate	an	independent	East	Timor	on	their	
doorstep,	 which	 had	 ‘communist’	 links	 (a	 claim	 made	 against	 FRETILIN).303	 Reportedly,	
Indonesian	officials	ordered	UDT	to	take	immediate	steps	to	dismantle	FRETILIN,	and	to	form	
an	 anti-communist	 front	 against	 them.	 In	 return,	 Indonesia	 promised	 its	 support	 for	UDT	
leadership	 in	 the	 independence	 process.304	With	 the	 tacit	 support	 of	 the	 Indonesians,	 in	
August	 1975,	 some	 leaders	 from	 UDT	 attempted	 to	 overthrow	 and	 imprison	 FRETILIN	
members,	 and	 seized	a	number	of	 key	 institutions	 in	Dili,	 leading	 to	a	bloody	civil	war.305	
Approximately	3,000	Timorese	fled	the	capital	during	the	fighting,	and	nearly	all	remaining	
Portuguese	 officials	 escaped	 the	 country.306	 By	November,	 it	 appeared	 that	 FRETILIN	 had	
quelled	the	UDT	assault,	and	had	gained	almost	entire	control	of	the	country.	Having	found	






in	 spite	 of	 the	 violent	 civil	 war,	 Portugal	 continued	 to	 have	 the	 “sole	 authority	 in	 the	
Territory.”308	However,	at	the	same	time,	moral	rhetoric	creeped	into	the	language	used	by	
Indonesia,	and	in	the	very	same	statement	it	also	claimed	that	it	had	a	“moral	obligation	to	

















protect	 the	 people	 in	 the	 Territory	 of	 Timor,”	 purportedly	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 that	 “the	






used	 with	 the	 specific	 intention	 of	 justifying	 and	 legitimising	 their	 impending	 military	
intervention	in	the	country.	While	Indonesia	was	one	of	the	first	nations	to	have	“destroyed	
the	vestiges	of	colonialism,”	in	their	own	liberation	from	Dutch	rule	more	than	twenty-five	

















Indonesian	 Foreign	 Minister,	 Adam	 Malik,	 announced	 Indonesia’s	 establishment	 of	 a	
‘provisional	government’	in	East	Timor.314	




312	 The	UNSC	 debated	 the	 intervention	 and	 unanimously	 passed	 a	 resolution	 on	 22	December	 deploring	 the	
invasion,	calling	for	the	immediate	withdrawal	of	Indonesian	troops,	and	reaffirming	the	right	of	the	people	of	
East	 Timor	 to	 self-determination.	 See	 The	 United	 Nations	 Security	 Council,	 “Resolution	 384	 (1975)	 of	 22	







The	 Indonesian	 invasion	 of	 East	 Timor	 was	 brutally	 violent.	 Many	 scholars	 and	









After	 the	 invasion,	 the	 Indonesian	 Armed	 Forces	 reported	 back	 on	 the	 ‘condition’	 of	 the	
Timorese	they	had	encountered:	
Feeble	 mentality	 is	 very	 evident	 among	 the	 Timorese,	 particularly	 among	 the	 older	
generation.	 Their	 feeble	mentality	 results	 in	 unhealthy	 physical	 and	 economic	 conditions.	
These	low	social,	economic,	and	mental	conditions	are	the	source	of	many	negative	features	
because	 they	 result	 in	 extremely	 inappropriate	 thought	 processes	 and	 experiences…	 East	
Timor	society	so	greatly	yearns	to	be	guided	and	directed	in	all	spheres	of	life.319	
The	civilisational	language	used	by	Indonesian	forces	and	officials	is	striking.	The	rhetoric	is	
very	 reminiscent	of	 the	 language	employed	by	European	colonisers,	during	 their	 ‘civilising	
missions.’	 The	 Timorese,	 in	 this	 regard,	 have	 clearly	 been	 cast	 as	 the	 different,	 weak,	
barbarians,	who	behave	badly	as	a	result	of	their	inferior	nature.	It	was	the	duty,	therefore,	
of	 the	advanced	 Indonesians	 to	 ‘guide’	and	 ‘direct’	Timorese	society.	The	portrayal	of	 the	
Timorese	 as	 being	 backward	 and	 subhuman	 facilitated	 the	 convincing	 of	 the	 Indonesian	
soldiers	that	they	were	fighting	against	something	innately	different	to	themselves.	As	the	



























enemy;	 force	 him	 into	 unconditional	 surrender;	 [and]	 re-educate	 him	 in	 the	 ways	 of	
democratic,	peace-loving	nations.”321	
	 Classical	 realist	 theorists	 E.H	 Carr,	 Carl	 Schmitt,	 and	Hans	Morgenthau	 all	 strongly	
warned	against	 the	casting	of	peoples	as	being	outside	of	humanity,	as	 it	 inevitably	made	
them	vulnerable	 to	 the	 imperialistic	ambitions	of	powerful	 states,	and	made	 international	
conflict	 more	 possible.	 The	 argument	 could	 be	 made	 that	 Indonesia’s	 positioning	 of	 the	
Timorese	as	being	outside	of	humanity,	was	made	easier	by	the	thought	already	promoted	
by	the	Portuguese,	that	the	Timorese	were	weak,	 feeble,	and	 inferior.	 Indeed,	 it	has	been	
argued	 that	 the	 stereotype	 of	 the	 ‘barbarian’	 is	most	 successful	 when	 it	 is	 leveraged	 off	
previously	held	 impressions	and	opinions.	 In	 this	 context,	Homi	K.	Bhabha,	a	pre-eminent	
scholar	in	the	field	of	contemporary	post-colonial	studies,	asserts	that,	“the	stereotype,	which	
is	 a	major	 discursive	 strategy,	 it	 is	 a	 form	 of	 knowledge	 and	 identification	 that	 vacillates	
between	what	 is	 already	 in	 place,	 already	 known,	 and	 something	 that	must	 be	 anxiously	
repeated.”322	In	this	regard,	a	repetitive	cycle	of	civilisational	language	is	wielded	against	the	



























of	the	 inherent	risks	 involved	 in	making	their	concerns	public,	 the	Assembly	reported	that	






















communist	 threat	 posed	by	 the	Portuguese	 ‘abandonment’	 of	 East	 Timor.333	 In	 response,	
                                                


















integrated	 into	 Indonesia,	 giving	almost	 identical	 rationale	 to	what	Soeharto	had	also	put	







level	 of	 direct	 and	 public	 involvement	 in	 the	 conflict	minimal.	 In	 a	 brief	 prepared	 by	 the	
Department	of	Foreign	Affairs	in	April,	1975,	it	was	reported	that	“the	degree	of	Australian	
involvement	will,	it	is	hoped,	be	kept	to	a	minimum.”337	This	theme	was	repeated	in	a	briefing	
paper	 prepared	 by	 the	 Australian	 Ambassador	 in	 Jakarta,	 who	 suggested	 that	 Australian	
policy	 should	 be	 based	 on	 “disengaging	 ourselves	 as	 far	 as	 possible	 from	 the	 Timor	
question.”338	 The	 Ambassador	 further	 recommended	 that	 if	 Indonesia	 was	 to	 intervene,	
Australia	should,	“act	 in	a	way	which	would	be	designed	to	minimise	 the	public	 impact	 in	
Australia	and	show	privately	understanding	to	Indonesia	of	their	problems.”339		
 While	hoping	to	keep	their	direct	involvement	in	the	conflict	‘to	a	minimum,’	due	to	





as	 a	 result	 of	 their	 “backwardness”	 and	 “inexperience.”340	 In	 the	 same	 cable,	 Australian	
officials	commented	on	their	perception	of	the	‘condition’	of	the	Timorese	people,	“social	and	
                                                
334	There	is	evidence	to	suggest	that	the	Australian	Prime	Minister’s	support	even	tipped	the	scales	in	Soeharto’s	
own	 decision	making	 on	 the	 invasion.	 According	 to	 a	 report	 by	 the	 Australian	 Ambassador	 to	 Portugal,	 until	
Soeharto’s	meeting	with	Whitlam	he	had	been	undecided	about	Timor’s	future.	However,	Whitlam	support	for	
East	Timor’s	 incorporation	 into	 Indonesia,	 “helped	 them	to	crystallise	 their	own	 thinking,	and	 they	were	now	



















to	 “handle”	 self-governing	 or	 independent	 status.342	 In	 these	 examples	 of	 diplomatic	
correspondence,	 there	 is	a	 clear	use	of	 civilisational	 language	 to	position	 the	Timorese	as	
being	inferior	and	backward.	
While	New	Zealand	did	not	have	nearly	the	same	level	of	influence	on	the	policies	of	













East	Timor	 issue.	 In	 the	week	after	 Indonesian	 intervention,	MFA	officials	 referenced	East	
Timor	as	“a	backward	colony.”346	In	a	report	by	the	New	Zealand	Ambassador	to	Indonesia,	
following	his	visit	 to	East	Timor	 in	1978,	he	made	his	assessment	of	 the	 ‘condition’	of	 the	
Timorese	people	in	striking	civilisational	language:	
In	 sum,	 the	 people	 are	 poor,	 small,	 riddled	with	 disease	 and	 almost	 totally	 illiterate,	 very	
simple	and,	as	we’re	told	again	and	again	‘primitive’.	They	are	almost	completely	under	the	
influence	of	their	‘Rajas’.	Considered	as	human	stock	they	are	not	at	all	impressive	–	and	this	















The	 judgement	 being	 made	 by	 these	 New	 Zealand	 officials	 appears	 to	 imply	 that	 their	









weak,	 and	 backward,	 had	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	 the	 future	 decisions	 and	 policies	 of	 the	
Australian	and	New	Zealand	governments.	It	has	been	suggested	that	the	decisions	made	by	
Whitlam	 and	 his	 officials	 firmly	 dictated	 the	 course	 of	 Australian	 policy	 on	 the	 issue	 of	









The	 position	 being	 promoted	 throughout	 these	 briefings	 and	 diplomatic	
communications	was	that	due	to	the	perceived	backwardness	of	Timorese	society,	Indonesian	
intervention	 could	 be	 justified.	 In	 this	 context,	 an	 implicit	 understanding	 was	 given	 that	





and	 customs	 applied	 to	 them	 in	 practice,	 it	 would	 have	 been	 difficult	 for	 Canberra	 and	











‘outside’	 of	 international	 society	 provided	 the	 rationale	 for	 various	 forms	 of	 domination,	
exploitation,	and	violent	actions,	against	the	Timorese.		
It	is	noteworthy	that	Australian	and	New	Zealand	officials	had	felt	that	it	was	within	
their	 purview	 to	make	 resolute	 conclusion	 on	 the	 perceived	 lower	 nature	 and	 backward	
condition	of	the	entire	Timorese	society.	This	reveals	their	own	sense	of	superiority,	as	well	
as	their	belief	in	their	‘enlightened’	nature.	This	demonstrates	the	ongoing	hierarchical	nature	
of	 the	 international	 system,	where	exceptionality	can	be	promoted	 in	order	 to	 justify	and	
legitimise	 violent	 intervention,	 against	 identified	 ‘lower	 ranked’	 peoples.	 The	 process	 of	
stereotyping	 an	 entire	 society	 of	 people	 as	 being	 “existentially	 something	 different	 and	











East	 Timor.354	 In	 order	 to	 deflect	 criticism	of	 Canberra’s	 decision	 to	 recognise	 Indonesian	




international	 agreement	which	 is	 very	much	 in	Australia’s	 interest.”355	 In	 the	 case	of	 East	
Timor,	humanitarian	principles,	fundamental	human	rights,	and	self-determination,	were	all	




Australian	 defence	 interests	 in	 the	 Portuguese	 Timor	 situation	 but	 I	 wonder	 whether	 the	 Department	 has	
ascertained	the	interest	of	the	Minister	of	the	Department	of	Minerals	and	Energy	in	the	Timor	situation.	It	would	
seem	to	me	that	this	Department	might	well	have	an	interest	in	closing	the	present	gap	in	the	agreed	sea	boarder	
and	 this	 could	 be	 much	 readily	 negotiated	 with	 Indonesia	 by	 closing	 the	 present	 gap	 that	 with	 Portugal	 or	
independent	Portuguese	Timor.	I	know	I	am	recommending	a	pragmatic	rather	than	a	principled	stand	but	that	
















Indonesia	 in	 regards	 to	 the	signing,	Evans	was	asked	by	 journalists	how	he	 reconciled	 the	
continued	 reports	 of	 mass	 killings	 and	 human	 rights	 abuses	 against	 the	 Timorese	 with	
Australia’s	close	relationship	with	Indonesia,	Evans	replied	that	the	human	rights	record	had	
“in	 our	 judgment,	 conspicuously	 improved,	 particularly	 under	 the	 present	 military	
arrangements.”358	This	was	in	spite	of	overwhelming	evidence,	from	reputable	agencies	such	
as	the	International	Committee	of	the	Red	Cross,	of	continuing	mass	killings	and	allegations	









overall	 improvements	 in	 Indonesia’s	 human	 rights	 environment,	 thereby	 minimising	
Indonesian	reaction	to	Australian	or	international	criticisms	by	acknowledging	past	or	overall	
improvements.”361	John	G.	Taylor	supports	this	assertion	in	his	analysis	of	Australian	foreign	
                                                
356	Gareth	Evans,	as	cited	 in	 James	Cotton,	“Introduction:	East	Timor	and	Australia	 -	Twenty-Five	Years	of	 the	
Policy	Debate,”	in	East	Timor	and	Australia:	AIIA	Contributions	to	the	Policy	Debate,	ed.	James	Cotton	(Canberra,	
Australia:	Australian	Defence	Studies	Centre	and	the	Australian	Institute	of	International	Affairs,	1999),	9.	



























and	 justify	 violent	 intervention	on	 the	part	 of	 the	 intervener,	 it	 can	 also	be	employed	by	
external	actors	 in	an	attempt	to	distance	themselves	from	having	any	responsibility	 in	the	
situation.	For	Australia	and	New	Zealand,	the	determination	was	made	that	state	self-interest	
dictated	 that	 East	 Timor	 should	 be	 under	 Indonesian	 control,	 even	 if	 it	 was	 contrary	 to	
universalistic	 humanitarian	 rhetoric,	 which	 has	 been	 enshrined	 and	 agreed	 upon	 in	
international	law.	In	order	to	convince	their	domestic	constituents	of	this	‘exception	to	the	
























Anderson	 argues	 that	 the	 footage	 of	 the	 Santa	 Cruz	 massacre	 “proved	 to	 have	 more	
immediate	 impact	 than	 the	mountains	 of	written	 evidence	 accumulated	 by	 human	 rights	
organizations	on	the	sixteen	previous	years	of	brutal	Indonesian	rule.”366		
While	 Santa	 Cruz	 was	 an	 important	 moment	 for	 galvanising	 activism	 and	 public	
attention,	with	academic	 research	and	media	coverage	on	East	Timor	 increasing	after	 the	
event,367	this	did	not	equate	to	meaningful	direct	action	on	the	part	of	any	of	Indonesia’s	key	
Western	 or	 Asian	 allies.	 Indeed,	 Australian	 Foreign	 Minister	 Gareth	 Evans	 immediately	
attempted	 to	minimise	 the	 involvement	 of	 the	 Indonesian	 Government	 in	 the	massacre,	
telling	 reporters	 that	 the	event	was	 “an	aberration,	not	 an	act	of	 state	policy.”368	Clinton	
Fernandes	reports	that	both	Evans,	and	Australian	Prime	Minister	Paul	Keating,	continued	to	
pursue	closer	military	ties	with	the	Soeharto	regime	in	the	aftermath	of	Santa	Cruz,	in	spite	
of	 a	 public	 outcry,	 including	 from	 Australian	 citizens.369	 An	 Amnesty	 International	 report	
supports	 the	 assertion	 that	 there	 appeared	 to	 be	 no	meaningful	 change	 to	 bilateral	 and	
multilateral	assistance	given	to	Indonesia,	even	though	some	governments	had	argued	that	
they	 had	 linked	 their	 economic	 assistance	 to	 Indonesia’s	 human	 rights	 performance.370	
Indeed,	 the	 report	 found	 that	 in	many	 cases,	 aid	 donations	 to	 Indonesia	 increased	 in	 the	




that	 Indonesia	 could	 no	 longer	 declare,	 “it	 had	 brought	modernization	 to	 backwater	 East	
Timor	and	that	the	Timorese,	aside	from	a	few	malcontents,	appreciated	these	efforts.”372	
Indeed,	Indonesian	Foreign	Minister	Ali	Alatas	later	famously	admitted;	“12	November	1991	
constituted	 a	 watershed	 in	 Indonesian	 diplomacy	 on	 East	 Timor	 and	 since	 that	 date,	
international	 support	 for	 Indonesia’s	 position	 inexorably	 declined	 while	 that	 for	 the	
independence	movement	in	East	Timor	markedly	increased.”373		























convinced	 the	 newly	 appointed	 President	 Habibie	 to	 announce	 a	 ‘special	 status’	 for	 East	
Timor,	which	gave	it	increased	autonomy	from	Indonesia.374	East	Timorese	leaders	rejected	
this	offer,	however,	and	immediately	called	for	a	referendum	to	be	internationally	supervised	
on	 East	 Timor’s	 future.375	 Negotiations	 occurred,	 primarily	 between	 Indonesian	 and	
Portuguese	 officials	 under	 UN	 auspices,	 and	 a	 number	 of	 packages,	 falling	 short	 of	
independence,	were	offered.	The	Timorese	held	strong	to	their	demand	for	a	referendum.376		
By	 May,	 1999,	 the	 UN,	 Indonesia,	 and	 Portugal	 all	 agreed	 that	 a	 ‘popular	
consultation’377	would	be	held	in	East	Timor,	in	August,	under	the	supervision	of	the	UN.	The	
consultation	would	 involve	 asking	 the	 Timorese	 if	 they	were	willing	 to	 approve	 a	 special	
autonomy	agreement	for	the	territory	within	Indonesia.	A	vote	against	autonomy	would	be	










through	 Resolution	 1246,	 the	 United	 Nations	 Mission	 in	 East	 Timor	 (UNAMET),	 with	 its	






























The	 New	 Zealand	 Government	 had	 proposed	 in	 early	 September	 that	 a	 regional	
grouping	 of	 countries	 could	 “mount	 a	 support	 operation	 to	 prevent	 the	 country	 from	
descending	 into	 chaos	 and	 halt	 the	 bloodshed.”383	 However,	 the	 Australian	 Government,	
unwilling	to	involve	itself	directly	in	the	conflict,	rebutted:	“just	for	everyone	who	still	has	not	
got	the	message,	Australia	has	no	intention	of	invading	Indonesia.”384	In	May,	1999,	Australian	


































by	 the	 UNSC	 to	 “take	 all	 necessary	 measures,”	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	 its	 mandate.390	 The	
deployment	 of	 INTERFET,	whose	 strength	 ultimately	 reached	 11,500	 troops,391	was	 not	 a	









and	 the	weak	 victims.	 This	 language	 echoed	 strongly	 the	 language	 used	 to	 legitimise	 the	





























“special	 burden	 of	 leadership,”	 to	 see	 that	 peace	was	 installed	 in	 East	 Timor.396	 Howard	
asserted	in	the	same	speech	that:	“our	troops	are	going	to	defend	what	this	society	believes	
to	be	 right.”397	 In	 the	case	of	New	Zealand,	Defence	Minister	Mark	Burton	 repeated	on	a	
number	of	occasions	that	it	was	New	Zealand’s	strong	desire	“to	protect	the	democratic	rights	










foreign	policy,	 in	which	Australia	 committed	 itself	 “to	being	 the	provider	of	 first	 resort	of	
regional	security	in	the	Pacific.”401	With	this	assertive	new	policy	came	the	necessary	sharp	
increase	in	the	Australian	defence	budget.402	Howard	told	reporters	that	in	the	new	security	
environment	“defence	will	have	 to	come	 first,”	and	he	 further	underlined	 that	 this	would	










Presentation	 Ceremony,	 Christchurch,	 22	 August,	 2001,”	New	 Zealand	 Government,	 accessed	 04	 July,	 2016,	
https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/speech-medal-presentation-ceremony-christchurch.	




party	 in	 New	 Zealand.	 Directly	 after	 his	 comment	 about	 the	 underprivileged	 cry	 for	 human	 rights,	 Robson	





402	 The	 Australian	 Government	 initially	 provided	 $860	million	 in	 supplementation	 to	 the	 Defence	 budget	 to	






achieve	 it,	 was	 based	 on	moral	 reasoning	 and	 principles.	 According	 to	 Howard,	 the	 new	
interventionist	policy	was	due	to	Australia’s	principled	decision	to	defend	“the	values	we	hold	
as	Australians.	We	were	willing	to	be	in	dispute	with	our	nearest	neighbour,	to	defend	those	











The	 Australian	 Government	 was	 not	 alone	 in	 its	 sense	 of	 a	 morally	 justified	
responsibility	and	leadership	in	the	region.	Albeit	on	a	smaller	scale,	New	Zealand	also	saw	
intervention	 in	 East	 Timor	 as	 an	 opportunity	 to	 demonstrate	 its	 ‘enlightened	 state’	
credentials,	and	also	to	enhance	its	relationship	with	the	United	States.	The	then	New	Zealand	
Foreign	Minister,	Phil	Goff,	made	explicit	Washington’s	expectation	of	New	Zealand’s	role	in	
the	 region,	 and	 that	 the	 United	 States	 had	 signalled	 its	 satisfaction	 with	 New	 Zealand’s	
current	activities:	“the	Americans	who	look	to	others	in	regional	areas	to	help	settle	conflict	





The	 sense	 of	 Australia’s	 moral	 superiority	 in	 the	 region,	 in	 particular,	 was	 widely	
picked	up	in	the	media	reporting	of	intervention	in	East	Timor.	Some	commentators	agreed	






























from	Australia	 in	 particular,	 resulted	 in	 the	promotion	of	 the	 sense	 they	were	 “agents	 of	
freedom,	 order,	 democracy,	 liberalisation,	 transparency,	 humanitarianism	 and	 human	




It	 certainly	 appears	 that	 there	 is	 a	 compelling	 relationship	 between	 the	 language	
employed	to	justify	civilising	missions	and	the	intervention	by	INTERFET	forces	in	East	Timor.	
For	 the	 language	 to	 have	 the	 desired	 effect,	 the	 East	 Timorese	 necessarily	 needed	 to	 be	
portrayed	as	the	antithesis	to	the	Australian	and	New	Zealanders:	undemocratic	and	illiberal,	
with	a	woeful	inability	to	protect	their	own	citizens.	As	Hans	Morgenthau	previously	warned,	
this	process	of	employing	simple	moralistic	 language,	 in	 terms	of	democratic	peace-loving	
nations	versus	those	who	are	not,	only	intensified	the	likelihood,	and	the	intensity,	of	conflict	
in	the	international	system.416	Indeed,	Orford	argues	that	the	intervention	stories	created	to	
                                                
409	 Peter	 Symonds,	 “Australian	 Foreign	 Minister	 Unveils	 Plan	 for	 the	 Colonial	 Occupation	 of	 East	 Timor,”	















It	 is	 her	 belief	 that	 this	 humanitarian	 interventionist	 rhetoric	 simply	 rehearses	 colonial	


















an	 elected	 legislature	 in	 East	 Timor,	 de	 Mello	 had	 the	 sole	 authority	 to	 issue	 legal	
regulations.421	 When	 considering	 UNMIK	 and	 UNTAET,	 Louise	 Frechette,	 the	 UN	 Deputy	
Secretary	General	at	the	time,	remarked	that	they	were:	“qualitatively	different	from	almost	









420	 Resolution	 1272	was	 established	 under	 Chapter	 VII	 of	 the	UN	Charter,	 it	 decreed	 that	 UNTAET	would	 be	
“endowed	with	overall	responsibility	for	the	administration	of	East	Timor	and	will	be	empowered	to	exercise	all	
legislative	 and	 executive	 authority,	 including	 the	 administration	 of	 justice.”	 United	 Nations	 Security	 Council,	








environment,	 there	was	a	 strong	 revival	of	 the	 idea	 that	 liberal	democratic	principles	and	
institutions	 should	 be	 transplanted	 onto	 conflict	 ridden	 societies,	 in	 order	 to	 bring	 about	
international	peace	and	security.	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	spreading	of	democracy	was	a	crucial	
element	of	the	security	policies	for	many	powerful	states,	particularly	the	United	States.	This	
was	based	heavily	on	 the	premise	 that	 liberal	democracies	do	not	wage	war	against	each	




be	 ‘rebuilt’	 in	the	 image	of	western	 liberal	democracies	and	to	ensure	that	 ‘humanitarian’	
suffering	was	addressed.425	In	some	cases,	it	was	argued	that	states	had	the	responsibility	to	
intervene	 in	cases	were	states	were	 failing	 to	protect	 their	own	citizens.426	 In	 this	 regard,	
‘Westphalian’	 notions	 of	 state	 sovereignty	 could	 be	 suspended,	 or	 sovereignty	 could	 be	





War-era.	 The	manner	 in	which	 intervention	was	 legitimised	 so	 closely	 resembled	 the	UN	
trusteeship	system	for	the	colonial	territories	after	World	War	II,	that	some	scholars	actually	
explicitly	called	for	neo-trusteeship	in	the	case	of	East	Timor.428 While	Peter	Lyon	conceded	




                                                
423	 This	 is	 otherwise	 down	 as	 the	 ‘Democratic	 Peace	 Theory,’	 and	 is	 based	 on	 the	 ideas	 first	 promoted	 by	
enlightenment-era	 theorist	 Immanuel	Kant.	 See	To	Perpetual	Peace:	A	Philosophical	 Sketch	 [1795],	 trans.	Ted	
Humphrey	(Indianapolis:	Hackett	Publishing,	2003).	
424	James	Cotton,	Timor-Leste	and	the	Discourse	of	State	Failure,	457.	
425	 While	 outside	 of	 the	 bounds	 of	 this	 thesis,	 there	 is	 clearly	 a	 strong	 conceptual	 link	 with	 the	 spread	 of	
democracy,	the	war	on	terror,	and	the	policies	surrounding	failing	and	failed	states.	See	Greg	Fry,	“Our	Patch:	The	
War	on	Terror	and	the	New	Interventionism,”	in	Intervention	and	State-Building	in	the	Pacific:	The	Legitimacy	of	
'Cooperative	 Intervention,’	eds.	 Tarcisius	 Tara	 Kabutaulaka	 and	Greg	 Fry	 (Manchester:	Manchester	 University	
Press,	2008),	79.	
426	 See	 International	 Commission	 on	 Intervention	 and	 State	 Sovereignty,	 “The	 Responsibility	 to	 Protect,	
December,	2001”	Report	of	the	International	Commission	on	Intervention	and	State	Sovereignty,	accessed	02	July,	
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The	 fundamental	 assumption	 was	 made	 that	 the	 bringing	 of	 liberal	 principles,	 such	 as	
democracy	 and	 good	 governance,	would	 further	 the	 Timorese	march	 towards	 a	Western	
conception	of	civilisation.	 Indeed,	as	has	been	previously	outlined,	 it	was	often	argued	by	
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process	as	an	attempt	 to	ensure	 that	 the	UN	did	not	 favour	one	emerging	political	party	over	another:	 “The	

















by	FRETILIN	 leader,	Xanana	Gusmão,	who	commented	that	 international	staff	were	of	 the	
opinion	that:	“the	East	Timorese	simply	lack	capacity.442	
	 National	reaction	against	UNTAET’s	failure	to	consult	and	involve	the	people	of	East	






pre-constitutional	monarch	 in	 a	 sovereign	 kingdom.”445	 The	 intense	 criticism	of	UNTAET’s	
actions	led	to	the	members	of	the	Timorese	cabinet	to	write	to	de	Mello,	and	the	following	
excerpt	provides	an	overview	of	their	 frustrations	over	the	 lack	of	 influence	Timorese	had	
over	the	running	of	their	own	country:	




437	A	number	of	 ‘in	 vogue’	 terms	were	 invoked	 to	explain	 and	 justify	 this	 level	 of	 control	 over	 the	Timorese,	
















outside	our	 control.	 The	 East	 Timorese	Cabinet	members	 are	 caricatures	 of	ministers	 in	 a	
government	of	a	banana	republic.	They	have	no	power,	no	duties,	nor	resources	to	function	
adequately.446	
It	has	been	 reported	 that	 some	of	 the	members	of	 the	cabinet	had	called	 for	acts	of	 civil	
disobedience	 against	 the	 UN,	 with	 some	 going	 as	 far	 as	 to	 suggest	 declaring	 unilateral	
independence	from	yet	another	group	of	“invaders.”447	This	turn	of	events	ended	up	being	
the	catalyst	for	a	purported	‘reorientation’	of	the	UN’s	approach	to	the	political	authority	and	
participation	 of	 the	 Timorese	 in	 the	 reconstruction	 of	 East	 Timor.448	 Indeed,	 soon	 after	
receiving	the	letter,	de	Mello	announced	his	intention	to	move	towards	‘co-government’	with	





	 The	 disillusionment	 and	 dissatisfaction	 with	 the	 UN’s	 performance	 did	 not	 abate	
following	the	empty	promises	of	a	‘Timorisation’	process.	Indeed,	Chopra	notes	that	the	CNRT	
was	provided	with	 little	 true	authority	or	decision-making	power,	and	 it	appeared	that	de	
Mello	was	unwilling	to	share	any	control	over	his	kingdom.450	It	was	Chopra’s	strong	belief	
that	UNTAET	dragged	its	feet	with	respect	to	true	power	sharing	with	the	Timorese.451	For	









country.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note,	 however,	 that	 the	 country	 today	 has	 finally	 gained	 it	
independence.	On	20	May,	2002,	the	United	Nations	ceded	control	over	the	country	and	the	

























all	 of	 the	 cases	 examined.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 Portuguese	 colonialism,	 there	was	 a	 systematic	
process	of	creating	a	clear	demarcation	in	the	civilisational	status	of	East	Timorese	people.	In	
their	 demonstration	 that	 uncivilised	 people	 existed	 in	 East	 Timor,	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	
showing	a	progression	to	advanced	civilisational	status	was	a	possibility,	Portugal	was	able	to	








needed	 to	 be	 justified	 in	 civilisational	 terms.	 Particularly	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 initial	 invasion	
period,	Jakarta	was	keen	to	promote	the	image	of	the	Indonesian’s	as	the	‘protectors’	and	
often	spoke	to	the	‘moral	obligation’	that	it	had	to	protect	the	people	of	East	Timor.	This	role	
as	 a	 protector	 was	 absolutely	 at	 odds	 with	 the	 brutal	 campaign	 of	 violence	 required	 to	
subjugate	and	dominate	the	Timorese	population.	The	violence	necessitated	the	positioning	
of	 the	 Timorese	 as	 being	 utterly	 different	 to	 the	 Indonesians.	 In	 this	 regard,	 Indonesia’s	
violent	recolonisation	project	relied	on	the	use	of	civilisational	language	to	depict	the	people	
of	 East	 Timor	 as	 backward,	 primitive,	 sub-humans.	 Reports	 by	 Indonesian	 officials	 on	 the	
‘condition’	 of	 the	 Timorese	 attempted	 to	 reinforce	 the	 stereotype	 that	 they	had	a	 feeble	
mentality	 and	 low	 social,	 economic,	 and	 mental	 conditions,	 which	 resulted	 in	 their	







inappropriate	 actions.	 It	would	 be	 the	 task,	 therefore,	 of	 the	 enlightened	 Indonesian’s	 to	
‘direct’	them,	in	all	spheres	of	life.	
	 In	order	to	justify	their	inaction	in	the	face	of	the	brutally	violent	occupation	of	East	
Timor,	 the	 Australian	 and	New	 Zealand	 governments	 continued	 this	 repetitive	 pattern	 of	
stereotyping	 the	 Timorese	 people.	 It	 was	 deemed	 to	 be	 in	 the	 national	 interest	 of	 both	












When	analysed	 in	 light	of	 the	actions	of	previous	 interveners,	 there	appears	 to	be	
nothing	new	about	the	manner	in	which	INTERFET	and	UNTAET	went	about	their	intervention	







missions,	and	 the	earlier	UN	 trusteeship	 system,	 the	population	of	East	Timor	was	placed	
under	the	tutelage	and	control	of	the	UN,	in	order	to	facilitate	the	nurturing	in	the	ways	of	













backward,	 inferior,	 others.	 The	 ingrained	 stereotyping	 of	 the	 people	 of	 East	 Timor,	 first	
promoted	 by	 the	 Portuguese,	was	 employed	 time	 and	 again,	 and	 proved	 very	 difficult	 to	
overcome.	As	has	been	previously	outlined,	these	stereotypes	are	most	successfully	wielded	
when	they	are	leveraged	off	previously	held	 impressions	and	opinions.	 In	this	context,	the	
people	 of	 East	 Timor	 have	 suffered	 at	 the	 hands	 of	 continuous	 and	 repetitive	 efforts	 to	
engrain	these	stereotypes.	This	has,	in	turn,	facilitated	violent	intervention	against	them,	as	
well	as	 constant	periods	of	 subjugation	and	domination	by	external	 forces.	 In	 this	 regard,	
there	 is	a	strong	argument	to	be	made	that	effusive	humanitarian	and	 liberal	rhetoric	has	






















This	 thesis	 has	 argued	 that	 a	 form	 of	 the	 standard	 of	 civilisation,	 and	 its	 accompanying	
civilising	missions,	are	evident	in	contemporary	international	relations.	While	at	times	they	
have	been	reproduced	and	rebranded	under	different	labels,	the	way	in	which	the	discourse	














this	 study	 found	 that	 their	 commentary	 sanctioned	 the	 continued	 intervention	 in	 the	
domestic	affairs	of	non-European	populations	by	hypothesising	a	number	of	exceptions	to	
their	 understanding	 that	 ‘uncivilised’	 peoples	 possessed	 natural	 rights.458	 In	 this	 context,	
Vitoria	also	provided	one	of	the	earliest	expressions	of	the	idea	that	civilised	nations	had	a	
duty	 of	 ‘brotherly	 correction’	 of	 the	 ‘natives,’	 whereby	 civilised	 nations	 were	 bound	 and	
obligated	to	administer	proper	governance	over	the	uncivilised,	and	teach	and	nurture	them	
in	the	ways	of	advanced	civilisation.459	
It	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 this	 positioning	of	 certain	 societies	 as	 being	 different	 and	
inferior	provided	European	colonisers	with	 the	normative	and	 legal	basis	 to	conduct	 their	
conquest	and	colonisation	of	non-European	societies.	 In	this	regard,	civilisational	 language	
gave	them	an	expansive	legitimising	mandate	for	violence	and	conflict.	Rather	than	provide	a	
‘civilising	 hand,’	 the	 reality	 of	 those	 living	 under	 colonial	 rule	 was	 often	 brutally	 violent	
regimes	of	domination	and	exploitation.460	This	early	historical	use	of	the	discourse	on	the	
                                                
458	Pope	Innocent	IV,	“Commentaria	Doctissima	in	Quinque	Libros	Decretalium,”	in	The	Expansion	of	Europe:	The	
First	 Phase,	ed.	 and	 trans.	 James	Muldoon	 (Pennsylvania:	 Pennsylvania	University	 Press,	 1977),	 191-192;	 and	








standard	 of	 civilisation	 has	 been	 argued	 to	 have	 had	 a	 profound	 impact	 on	 legal	
understandings	of	indigenous	population	status	and	rights,	for	centuries	to	come.		
During	 the	eighteenth	century	 it	has	been	explained	 that	 there	was	an	attempt	 to	
reconceptualise	the	rights	of	man.	It	has	been	argued	that	in	the	dominant	discourse	of	this	




promoted	 ‘universal’	 ideals	 became	 the	 dominant	 occurrence.	 These	 ‘exceptions’	 in	
enlightenment	discourse	directly	contradicted	any	‘universality’	to	the	principles.	As	a	result,	
it	has	been	argued	the	actual	impact	of	this	effusive	language	was	found	to	be	nearly	non-
existent	 for	 the	people	under	 colonial	 rule.	 Purported	universal	 principles	of	 equality	 and	
humanity	 were	 superseded,	 in	 order	 to	 allow	 for	 the	 continued	 intervention	 against	
‘uncivilised’	peoples.	
Due	to	the	discourse	on	humanitarianism	and	equality,	there	was	an	acceptance	by	
the	colonising	nations	 that	 it	would	appear	 improper	 to	not	acknowledge	these	 ‘universal	
principles’	 in	 the	 practice	 of	 intervention.462	 It	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 it	 became	 widely	









As	a	 result	of	 the	unprecedented	total	wars	of	World	War	 I	and	World	War	 II,	 this	
study	has	found	that	there	were	challenges	to	the	understanding	of	who	in	the	international	
system	could	be	deemed	 ‘civilised,’	and	who	were	the	 ‘barbarians’.	Civilisational	 language	
was	heavily	interwoven	into	the	propaganda	of	both	sides	of	the	wars,	in	order	to	demonise	
and	dehumanise	the	enemy.463	However,	because	these	wars	were	fought	in	Europe,	against	
Europeans,	 it	meant	 that	 ‘enlightened	 civilisers,’	 could	 necessarily	 become	 the	 ‘barbarian	
other.’	 This	 arguably	 changed	 the	 way	 that	 Europeans	 saw	 themselves,	 and	 also	 had	 an	
impact	on	their	understanding	of	the	nature	of	people	outside	of	Europe.		












a	 new	 system	 of	 internationalised	 control	 was	 installed.	 Under	 the	 League	 of	 Nations	
mandate	system,	external	 states	were	granted	 formal	 legal	 control	and	guardianship	over	
territories,	 in	 a	 “sacred	 trust	of	 civilisation.”466	 The	newly	 formed	 international	 institution	










the	 trusteeship	 system,	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 trusteeship	 system	 largely	mirrored	 that	 of	 its	
predecessor.	Both	the	mandate	and	trusteeship	systems	continued	the	pattern	of	positioning	




Classical	 realism	 has	 provided	 an	 important	 critical	 analysis	 of	 the	 standard	 of	
civilisation,	civilising	missions,	and	the	colonial	activities	of	western	European	nations.	Each	
of	 the	 realist	 theorists	 examined	 in	 the	 thesis	have	provided	damning	 criticisms	of	 liberal	
imperialism	 of	 universal	 moralistic	 language	 and	 practices.	 Carl	 Schmitt	 forewarned	 that	
realism	would	not	be	without	its	own	critiques,	who	would	attempt	to	refute	the	“political	
phenomena	 and	 truths,”	 of	 realism,	 	 and	 would	 instead	 call	 it	 “amoral,	 uneconomical,	
















been	 argued	 that	 classical	 realism	 provides	 an	 undervalued	 and	 understudied	 critique	 of	
colonialism	and	standard	of	civilisation	discourse.		
	 E.H	Carr,	Carl	Schmitt,	and	Hans	Morgenthau	all	strongly	warned	against	the	use	of	
language	 which	 had	 all	 encompassing	 and	 universal	 appeal,	 as	 it	 has	 dangerous	 and	
unintended	consequences.	It	has	been	argued	that	this		language	has	the	effect	of	creating	a	
troubling	 friend	 versus	 enemy	 dichotomy,471	 or	 dangerous	 distinctions	 between	 so-called	
“peace-loving	nations”	versus	the	“forces	of	evil.”472	
The	 thesis	has	examined	and	analysed	a	 range	of	 interventions	 in	 the	case	of	East	
Timor.	 It	 has	 been	 argued	 there	 has	 been	 a	 continuous	 pattern	 of	 violent	 actions	 and	










in	 accordance	with	western	 standards	 of	 civilisation.	 The	 interventions	 conducted	 in	 East	
Timor	were	never	based	on	the	altruistic	notions	of	a	common	humanity,	or	universal	human	
right.	 Rather,	 in	 each	 case	 intervention	 was	 symptomatic	 of	 calculated	 assessments	 of	
national	interest,	or	the	interest	of	states	shielded	behind	international	law	and	institutions.	




time,	 the	 effect	 of	 classify	 entire	 societies	 of	 people	 as	 being	 inferior	 and	 different	 has	
endured.	It	has	been	argued	that	the	case	of	East	Timor	proves	that	civilisational	language	
and	its	associated	practices	continue	to	exist	in	contemporary	international	relations.	
                                                








generate	 destructive	 consequences	 for	 the	 states	 it	 is	 wielded	 against	 and	 for	 the	wider	
international	community.	The	objective	of	the	study	was	to	bring	attention	to	the	dangers	of	
employing	civilisational	language	in	order	to	justify	and	legitimise	intervention.	In	this	regard,	
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